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1 Introduction 
 
  One of the greatest mysteries in the language literature is how children learn 
language. From the middle of the 20th century until today there have been many theoretical 
speculations about language acquisition. The major issue among these different theories is the 
nature-nurture debate. Are there any innate mechanisms in the brain which are specialized for 
language learning or do children learn language in much the same way as they learn how to 
walk or write? When it comes to the studies of typical child development, researchers’ 
opinions regarding language acquisition are divided; some support the nativist point of view 
(Nativism) while the others support the empirical point of view (Constructivism). However, 
in the studies of atypical child development researchers seem to be favoring the nativist 
stance.  
In this paper, I will look at the studies that have investigated language acquisition of 
people with Williams Syndrome (henceforward WS). WS is a rare neurodevelopmental 
disorder, which is usually characterized by intact verbal intelligence alongside severe 
cognitive impairments. The discovery of WS and its unusual cognitive profile has intrigued 
many linguists. In the search for the explanation of the WS language phenomenon, the 
constructivist approach seems to be inadequate because their main argument is that language 
development is inseparable from the rest of the cognition. On the other hand, the nativist 
approach offers a very plausible explanation. Nativists argue that the uneven cognitive profile 
of WS confirms their theory that language is innate and independent from the rest of the 
cognition. However, these are not the only alternatives. Relatively recently a new approach to 
language acquisition (Neuroconstructivism) has been developed. Neuroconstructivism 
embraced both the nature and nurture point of view. By doing so, it challenged the nativist 
claim that WS can be taken as evidence for dissociation of language and the rest of the 
cognition.   
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the language of mentally challenged 
individuals, such as individuals with WS, can give us an insight into the language acquisition 
of typically developing children. To accomplish this investigation, I will discuss three main 
issues surrounding the debate about WS language. First, I will examine whether WS language 
skills are indeed significantly better than the rest of their cognitive skills. Second, I will try to 
find out whether the language development of WS children follows the same path as the 
language development of normal children. And third, I will investigate whether WS non-
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verbal cognitive skills have any influence on their language skills. I will approach these 
issues by analyzing and comparing various language studies done on WS individuals.  
I will start this endeavor by presenting the main arguments which stand behind the 
domain-specific (Nativism) and domain-general (Constructivism) approach to language 
acquisition. Then, I will show that there is an alternative to these two approaches. This 
alternative is domain-relevant approach (Neuroconstructivism) to language acquisition.  
Next, in chapter three, I will discuss how nativists use Fodor's Modularity theory 
when they attempt to explain unusual cognitive profile of WS people. At the same time, I will 
present how the inconsistencies in WS cognition are explained from the neuroconstructivist 
point of view.  
In chapter four, I will first introduce the reader to the main characteristics of WS by 
explaining its cause and by describing the physical, psychological and cognitive profile of 
individuals born with this syndrome. Then, the review of the empirical studies on WS will 
follow. This review will be presented in chronological order, and the main focus will be on 
language studies of English-speaking individuals with WS. After analyzing the findings from 
these studies, in the summary of this chapter, I will address the first issue about WS language.  
Chapter five will address the second issue about WS language. Here, I will compare 
the vocabulary acquisition of infants with WS to the vocabulary acquisition of typically 
developing infants. 
Chapters six and seven will closely examine the semantics of WS language. In the 
summary of the chapter seven, I will address the third issue about WS language.  
Finally, in chapter eight, I will discuss whether WS language development can be a 
window into the typical language development.  
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2 Language Acquisition- Theoretical Background 
 
The majority of linguists who study normal and atypical language development – 
from the Chomskyan nativist to the most domain-general constructivist – agree that both 
genes and environment play a part in child language acquisition. One major difference 
between the theories is in the claim in what way and to what degree genes and environment 
contribute to developmental outcomes. Nativists argue that language is innate and a domain-
specific module in the human brain. For them, the environment acts simply as a trigger for 
recognizing and setting native-language parameters of universal grammar (Chomsky, 1972, 
1980, 1986; Pinker 1991, 1994). In constructivist’s view, on the other hand, the environment 
is a driving force in language acquisition (Bruner, 1983; Nelson 1985; Clark 1993; Goldberg, 
1995; 2006; Tomasello, 2003). Constructivists acknowledge that the ability to learn language 
is specific to humans. Nevertheless, they claim that the input plays a crucial role in language 
acquisition (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011). These two divergent theories, however, are not the 
only alternatives. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) suggests that the nativist and constructivist 
approach should not necessarily be mutually exclusive. She argues that normal and atypical 
language development “encompasses the dynamics of a rich process of interaction between 
mind and environment” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998, p. 9). Therefore, she proposes a 
reconciliation of nativism and constructivism displayed in the theoretical framework of 
neuroconstrucitivism. 
In the following sections, I will first present the basic theoretical assumptions of 
nativism and constructivism, before I introduce the relatively new theoretical approach to 
language acquisition, neuroconstructivism.  
 
 
2.1 Nativism (domain-specific approach) 
 
The nativist approach to language acquisition is based on Chomsky's (1972, 1986) 
innateness hypothesis. The innateness hypothesis rests on the claim that the newborn brain is 
genetically endowed with the underlying system of grammatical rules.  
This approach has been especially influential since the late 1950s when Chomsky 
stated that behaviorism (which argues that the infant brain is a tabula rasa or a blank paper on 
which linguistic experience imprints its structure) could not explain language acquisition 
(Chomsky, 1959). Chomsky (1980) argued that it is impossible that language is learned 
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solely through the input because there is not enough linguistic information available in the 
environment to account for the complex grammar children eventually acquire. In addition, 
Chomsky (1972, 1986) noted that adult’s everyday language could be full of unfinished 
sentences, mistakes, and slip of the tongues. However, even with the limited input, children 
become proficient speakers who can produce and process an infinite number of novel 
sentences. In other words, according to nativists, the primary linguistic data to which children 
are exposed to is often very poor to justify the rich linguistic knowledge that is gained in the 
end. This is also called Poverty of the Stimulus argument. 
Chomsky (1986) also emphasized that children, regardless of their language 
background, go through the similar stages of language development, beginning with single 
words utterances, advancing to the more complex combination of words until finally reaching 
fully-formed adult-like sentences. This development is typically very rapid, with first words 
appearing at around twelve months, first word-combinations at around eighteen months, and 
by the age of thirty months, children have usually acquired most of the essential grammatical 
rules of their language. The instance of uniformity and rapidity of language acquisition is 
another argument nativists use to claim that some aspects of language must be “genetically 
imprinted” in the human brain (cf. Radford, 2004; Gleason & Ratner, 2009).  
According to Chomsky (1986), humans possess a language faculty for processing 
language. Theoretically speaking, the language faculty “provides children with a genetically 
transmitted algorithm for developing a grammar” (Radford, 2004, p. 11). Nativists argue that 
the language faculty is an autonomous area, separated from all other cognitive areas in the 
brain (see Fodor, 1983; Pinker, 1991, 1994). In other words, "the brain mechanisms by which 
the child learns language are not only considered innate, but also entirely domain specific - 
that is, dedicated only to language learning" (Karmiloff-Smith, & Karmiloff, 2001, p. 5). In 
nativist view, therefore, children are born with an innate language module. This will be 
further discussed in chapter 3. 
 
 
2.2 Constructivism (domain-general approach) 
 
 The constructivist approach to language acquisition advocates that essentially all 
aspects of language (including grammatical categories) are learned or "constructed on the 
basis of input together with general cognitive, pragmatic and processing constraints" 
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(Goldberg, 2006, p. 3). Contrary to nativists, constructivists reject the idea that children are 
born with an innate knowledge of grammar (see Goldberg, 1995, 2006).  
 The constructivist theory has its roots in the general concept of psychological 
empiricism. The idea that linguistic knowledge is acquired only through observation, 
experience and evidence originates from the psychological approach to child development of 
Jean Piaget (1952). For Piaget and his disciples, such as Sinclair (1971, 1987), language 
acquisition involves domain-general learning processes which operate across all areas of 
linguistic and nonlinguistic cognition. In their view, the infant comes to the world with the 
"knowledge-empty" mind, in which all aspects of cognition are "emergent products of a self-
organizing system that is directly affected by its interaction with the environment" 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 9). The way in which children learn language is not different from 
the way in which they learn to use other skills since all areas in the brain are considered to be 
interconnected. For instance, Sinclair (1971) proposed that the child's ability to set Russian 
dolls one inside the other forms the basis for the child's later ability to comprehend how 
sentences can be embedded within one another. Hence, according to constructivists, the 
general cognitive development is a prerequisite for the normal language development (see 
section 5.1). 
 Most constructivists study language from the socio-pragmatic perspective (e.g., 
Nelson, 1985; Clark, 1993; Tomasello, 2003), which was initially proposed by Jerome 
Bruner. Bruner (1983) maintains that the role of social interaction is fundamental to the 
children's ability to learn language. In social interaction, (initially in a mother-infant 
relationship, and later in an interaction with the rest of the child's social environment) 
children start to recognize the rules for communication. One of the earliest signs of 
communication, from the socio-pragmatic point of view, is "the [children's] ability to make 
social-pragmatic inferences regarding a speaker's focus of attention and his or her 
communicative intentions" (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011, p. 3). This ability is commonly called 
joint attention. Many linguists nowadays recognize the children's maturity to establish joint 
attention as a very significant step for the normal development of their vocabulary (see 
section 5.1.2).    
 We see that, from the both cognitive and socio-pragmatic perspective of the 
constructivist approach, the brain mechanisms responsible for language learning are domain-
general. That is, according to constructivists, children use the same mechanisms for language 
learning as they do for learning about other aspects of the world.  
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2.3 An alternative to domain-specific and domain-general approach 
  
 The nature-nurture debate has been going on for many years now. During all these 
years, nativist and constructivist stances on language acquisition seem to be irreconcilable. A 
developmental neuropsychologist, Karmiloff-Smith (1992), argued that this debate is not a 
constructive one. Instead of opting for nativism or constructivism, she suggests that these 
theories should be observed as complementary in fundamental ways and that an ultimate 
theory of language acquisition, and human cognition in general, should include aspects of 
both nativism and constructivism. Therefore, as an alternative, Karmiloff-Smith (1998) 
proposes the domain-relative framework implemented by neurocostructivism.  
 
2.3.1 Neuroconstructivism (domain-relevant approach)  
 
 Neuroconstructivist theory is primarily a theory which focuses on the study of 
language development. From the developmental perspective, neuroconstructivism tries to 
embrace both innate predispositions and the interaction with the environment. Karmiloff-
Smith (1992), one of the firmest advocates of neuroconstructivism, argued that, with certain 
provisos, the reconciliation of nativism and constructivism is possible. She suggests the 
following modifications. 
 On the one hand, she criticizes "the exclusive focus of nativists like Fodor and 
Chomsky on biologically specified modules [because such stance] leaves little room for rich 
epigenetic-constructivist processes" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 10). Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
argues that children, in the process of language development, become active participants in 
the construction of their own knowledge. Her claim is that the nativist insistence on a 
specified language module neglects the importance of learning process, i.e. the process of 
gradual language development. Therefore, she suggests that an important addition to nativism 
would be Piaget's view of the developmental process. 
 On the other hand, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that Piagetian domain-general 
sensorimotor development alone cannot account for the acquisition of language. Syntax, for 
instance, does not simply stem from free play or problem solving with toys because, as 
Karmiloff-Smith explains, neither lining up of objects creates the basis for word order nor 
does nesting of one toy inside another create the basis for embedded sentences. Therefore, 
she suggests that constructivism should add some innate domain-specific predispositions 
which would grant the epigenetic process a head start in language development. In other 
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words, she proposes that initial language endowment needs to include some innate biological 
constraints. However, these constraints have to be less detailed and less specific than nativists 
claim.  
 As mentioned above, neuroconstructivism strongly opposes nativist explanation of 
language competence in terms of built-in core knowledge because it disregards the prospect 
of developmental changes in the brain. Many studies of early brain damage show that human 
brain is far more flexible than the strict modularity would suggest (see Tillema et al., 2008; 
Ilves et al., 2014). In this regard, neuroconstructivists stress that "the brain is not pre-
structured with ready-made representations [rather] it is channeled to progressively develop 
representations via interactions with both the external environment and its own internal 
environment" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 10). Furthermore, a clear distinction has to be made 
between the domain-specific and domain-relevant proposal of what is innate. On the one 
hand, nativists propose a genetic blueprint for pre-specified modules that are present at birth, 
and on the other, neuroconstructivists propose initial constraints or predispositions that direct 
attention to relevant environmental inputs. In contrast to domain-specific approach, the 
domain-relevant approach proposes that "the brain starts out with a number of constraints 
each of which is somewhat more relevant to the processing of certain kinds of input [e.g., 
language, face processing] over others, but which [can] become domain-specific over 
developmental time" (Karmiloff-Smith, 2015, p. 93). In short, instead of nativist pre-
specified modules, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) proposes a more progressive process of 
modularization. 
 In the next chapter, I will first briefly summarize Fodor's Modularity theory, then in 
section 3.1, I will return to the subject of neuroconstructivism where the proposal of a 
progressive process of modularization will be discussed in more detail. 
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3 Modularity Theory 
 
 The concept of modularity comes from the idea that a system as a whole can consist 
of a set of parts, each of which has a different specialized function. This concept is at the 
center of many debates led by cognitive and neuroscientists, and generally by theoreticians 
who deal with the structure of the mind/brain. Broadly speaking, modularity theory tries to 
explain to what degree the cognitive domains can be considered separable. In other words, 
can cognitive domains operate independently of one another? The exact definition of a 
module varies across disciplines and theoretical approaches. 
 The most fervent proponent of modularity theory is Jerry Fodor (1983). He claims 
that certain cognitive processes are self-contained or modular. A module, according to Fodor, 
is:  
"...a closed system (encapsulation) that is not available to conscious awareness 
(unconscious) is mediated by a dedicated neural system (localization) and 
deals exclusively with one particular information type (domain-specificity)..."  
 
        (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011, p. 359) 
In linguistics, the concept of modularity is tightly linked to the field of developmental 
neuropsychology. The main objective of this discipline has been to use patterns of 
developmental impairment to explain a model of normal state processes and brain structure. 
In this manner, linguists of a nativist persuasion (e.g., Pinker, 1991, 1999; Pinker & Prince, 
1994; Flavell et al., 1993; Levy, 1996) use research findings of clinical cases of individuals 
with neurodevelopmental disorders, to argue for a disassociation between language other 
cognitive domains, i.e., to argue for the existence of language module.  
 The strongest evidence which nativists use to account for language module comes 
from the examples of the so-called double dissociation (DD). The underlying logic of DD is 
following: "Due to genetic impairment, child A fails to learn skill X but learns skill Y. 
Another Child, B, shows the opposite pattern, where he learns Y but not X" (Elsabbagh & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2004, p. 5). In line with this logic, researchers deduce that skills X and Y 
are built upon a different set of genes. Thus, a child who is missing a particular set of genes is 
assumed to miss the necessary module to develop the skill which is normally built upon that 
particular set of genes. Pinker (1999) described the example of DD as follows: 
 
"…Overall, the genetic double dissociation is striking […] The genes of one 
group of children [Specific Language Impairment] impair their grammar while 
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sparing their intelligence; the genes of another group of children [Williams 
syndrome] impair their intelligence while sparing their grammar"  
(p. 262). 
 
Many linguists share Pinker's stance on the subject in question (e.g., Bellugi et al. 1994, 
2000; Clahsen & Almazan, 1998). Moreover, as the investigations of WS started to develop 
into more detailed experimental studies (i.e., studies that observe all aspects of language 
separately), the researchers started to propose more specific, within-language dissociations 
(cf. section 4.3). Nevertheless, in recent years, the modularity theory has been strongly 
challenged, especially by the relatively new approach to language acquisition, the above-
discussed Neuroconstructivism (cf. section 2.3.1).  
 
 
3.1 Beyond modularity 
 
 As presented in the previous section, the existence of neurodevelopmental disorders 
with uneven cognitive profiles (such as WS) has led researchers to divide the mind/brain into 
separate modules. Thus, we have a module for number, face processing, space, language, etc. 
(Pinker, 1999; Bellugi et al., 1988). Moreover, they argue that each module is being 
processed within a specialized area of the brain. These modular, domain-specific 
explanations have also been generalized to studies of typically developing children. 
Consequently, when comparing cognitive abilities of typically and atypically developing 
children, different abilities of individuals with disorders are commonly described as either 
intact or impaired. Neuroconstructivists do not agree with this. 
 
3.1.1 Pre-specified modules vs. the process of modularization 
  
 The straightforward application of modularity theory to apparent selective behavioral 
failures in developmental disorders raises a number of issues. All these issues come from the 
fact that development is an adaptive process. During this adaptive process individual’s 
cognitive system is trying to "optimize his or her interactions with the physical and social 
environments" (Thomas et al., 2013, p. 485). Thus, behavioral deficits or achievements that 
appear during development must be explained in terms of the developmental process itself. 
With this in mind, neuroconstructivists suggest that the explanations should embrace the key 
concepts which characterize developmental theories. They are the following:  
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(1) plasticity - the idea that the cognitive system changes its structure in 
response to experience, 
(2) interactivity - the idea that cognitive components interact with each 
other across development,  
(3) redundancy - the idea that a given task can be accomplished equally 
adequately by more than one system,   
(4) compensation - the idea that certain behaviors can be delivered in 
different ways (perhaps not as well) by alternative systems.  
 
      (Thomas et al., 2013, p. 485) 
 
When something goes awry in the process of development, the cognitive system aims to 
adapt itself to the existing situation by using alternative paths. However, this does not mean 
that the successful developmental outcomes should be described as intact. From the 
neurocostructivist point of view, the proper explanation of the behavioral deficits or 
achievements in developmental disorders should include identifying developmental 
trajectories and analyzing how innate constraints have been altered by the disorder during 
different developmental times (see Bishop, 1997; Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; Temple, 1997; 
Thomas, 2013). 
   
3.1.2 Developmental trajectories 
 
 Neuroconstrutivists stress that, in order to explain developmental outcomes more 
accurately, it is important to chart full developmental trajectories (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). 
By looking at developmental trajectories, researchers can assess how changes occur from 
infancy onwards. Moreover, by analyzing the trajectories, they can discover how, at different 
developmental times, the interaction among the various brain parts may change. For example, 
a process that is essential at Time 3 may be irrelevant for a process at Time 5. However, the 
development of the process at Time 3 may have been crucial for a successful or unsuccessful 
developmental outcome. For this reason, neuroconstructivists insist that developmental 
timing is a vital factor that needs to be considered when studying language development, 
especially in the atypical case (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009).  
 Some studies on WS language development have revealed that individuals with WS, 
when compared to other mentally disabled groups, show different language results in infancy 
or early childhood than in adulthood (see Volterra et al., 1996; Paterson et al., 1999; Paterson, 
2000). These findings imply that it is not enough to study the end state of language 
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development and then arrive at a conclusion that language in WS is intact or impaired. For 
example, the subtle differences found during the process of language acquisition in WS 
cannot confirm that their language is intact (Paterson, 2000). These differences can only 
indicate that the brain found its way, by using different cognitive processes, to adapt its 
mechanisms and arrive at a more or less successful outcome.  
 
3.1.3 Static vs. Dynamic approach to language acquisition 
 
 To fully comprehend the neuroconstructivist approach one should also understand that 
the interaction between nature and nurture, proposed by this school of thought, is a complex 
interaction between genes and environment. Karmiloff-Smith (1998) clarifies that: 
 
"...on the gene side, the interaction lies in the outcome of the indirect, 
cascading effects of interacting genes and their environments and, on the 
environment side, the interaction comes from the infant’s progressive 
selection and processing of different kinds of input" 
 (p. 390) 
 
From both nativist and constructivist point of view, the notion of ‘environment’ is perceived 
as a static factor. This is, according to Karmiloff-Smith (1998), another adjustment that needs 
to be made when endeavoring to understand language acquisition. She explains that both 
normal and atypical language development is, by all means, a dynamic process. Thus, the 
way children process language inputs is probably altered repeatedly under the influence of 
the development itself. For this reason, Karmiloff-Smith (1998) emphasized that the very 
research has to have a dynamic approach to language acquisition. Applying the static 
approach to atypical language acquisition might yield questionable conclusions. 
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4 Williams Syndrome 
 
Williams syndrome (WS) was first identified in 1961 by a New Zealand cardiologist 
John C. R. Williams. He described it as a condition involving serious heart defect, mental 
retardation, and distinctive facial features (Williams, Barrett-Boyes, & Lowe, 1961). In some 
of the earlier articles, WS was also defined as the syndrome with idiopathic infantile 
hypercalcaemia because it involves abnormal calcium metabolism (Beuren, Apitz, & 
Harmanz, 1962; von Arnim & Engel, 1964). Two decades after the initial recognition, 
researchers discovered many significant characteristics of WS which helped them understand 
the psychology and biology of individuals born with this syndrome. However, it was not 
before 1993 that the genetic basis of WS was identified (Ewart et al., 1993). Today, it is 
known that WS is caused by a micro-deletion of approximately 20 contiguous genes on the 
long arm of chromosome 7 (Korenberg et al., 2000). The estimated occurrence of this 
neurodevelopmental disorder is 1 in 20,000 live births (Morris et al., 1988). The more recent 
study, however, rates its prevalence of nearly 1:7,500 (see Strømme et al., 2002).  
The lack of the genetic material causes a number of physiological and psychological 
symptoms which characterize WS. Some of the frequent health issues related to WS are 
cardiovascular and renal abnormalities, general “failure to thrive” in infancy, and abnormal 
sensitivity to certain sounds - hyperacusis (von Arnim & Engel, 1964; Morris et al., 1988; 
Hagerman, 1999). The physical appearance of WS individuals is marked by low height, slight 
build, and specific facial morphology. Facial features of people with WS are sometimes 
referred to as “pixie-like” or “elfin” facies (Jones & Smith, 1975). WS individuals typically 
have a broad forehead, blue eyes with a stellate iris pattern, full cheeks, a short-upturned 
nose, a wide mouth, prominent lips, and small and widely spaced teeth (Semel & Rosner, 
2003). The most common psychological characteristic of WS individuals is a pronounced 
friendliness and an obvious predisposition to empathic behaviors (Doyle et al., 2004; Frigerio 
et al., 2006). 
At the cognitive level, WS children show evident developmental delays and learning 
disabilities. Nevertheless, what researchers find intriguing is the fact that in the adult 
phenotype WS individuals exhibit uneven cognitive profile (Bellugi et al., 1994). Namely, an 
overall IQ score (on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Revised, WISC-R) of WS 
individuals is ranging from 40 to 90. With these wide-ranging scores, they fall into the 
category of moderately to mildly intellectually disabled (Mervis & Becerra, 2007). Yet, when 
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one examines their scores on different IQ subtests separately, it turns out that not all their 
cognitive abilities are equally impaired. For instance, WS subjects show very good results on 
language tests (Bellugi et al., 1988) while their visuo-spatial abilities are very limited 
(Atkinson et al., 2001; Farran & Jarrold, 2003). Furthermore, the results WS subjects achieve 
on standardized tests of face recognition usually fall into the range of normal performance 
(Gagliardi et al. 2003), while they exhibit severe deficits in numerical cognition, problem-
solving and planning (Bellugi et al. 1988, 1994; Paterson et al. 1999; Paterson, 2000). Bellugi 
and her colleagues (1994) argued that the low overall IQ score of WS individuals simply 
camouflages the obvious discrepancies in their specific cognitive abilities. They claimed that 
some of WS true intellectual potentials could not be mirrored in their general IQ scores.  
In the following sections, I will give an overview of the investigations on WS 
population with the special focus on language studies. This will be a chronological review, 
beginning with the earliest studies on WS from the 1960s and 1970s and finishing with the 
more specific language studies on WS conducted during the 1990s until the present day.  
 
 
4.1 Early studies on WS  
  
 Early investigations of WS were usually multifaceted studies which presented a rather 
broad description of WS. These studies observed medical, physiological, behavioral, 
cognitive and linguistic aspects of the WS profile. One such study was conducted by von 
Arnim and Engel in 1964. They investigated the profiles of four WS individuals who were 
between 5 and 15 years of age. The participants' IQ scores ranged from 43 to 56. In the 
summary of their study, von Arnim and Engel (1964) characterized the participants as 
individuals who have physical growth deficiency, poor motor coordination, and periodic 
signs of unreasonable anxiety, but on the other hand excellent social skills and an "unusual 
command of language" (p. 367). They also pointed out that "loquacity combined with 
friendliness and a great ability to make interpersonal contacts makes them appear brighter 
and more intelligent than in fact they are" (Arnim & Engel, 1964, p. 375).  
 A decade later, Jones and Smith (1975) published their research data on 14 WS 
subjects. The participants in this study were children and adults with WS who were aged 3 
months to 23 years. Their full IQ scores ranged between 41 and 80. This study described WS 
behavior as "friendly, loquacious, and cocktail party manner" alongside mental deficiency 
(Jones and Smith, 1975, p. 719).  
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 In 1978, Bennett et al. conducted a study of WS in which they used the McCarthy 
Scales of Children’s Abilities (McCarthy, 1972). This was the first endeavor to systematically 
present measured data on individuals with WS. The study included seven children with WS 
who were 4;6–8;5 years of age. Their overall IQ scores ranged between 30 and 81 (mean 
53.9). The results of this study showed that all seven participants scored better on tests of 
verbal ability than on the tests of fine motor and gross motor abilities. Bennett et al. (1978) 
concluded that WS language skills were superior as opposed to their poor motor skills and 
cognitive impairments.  
 Even though these pioneering studies of WS offered a very general picture of WS 
profile, they tended to propose the possible cognitive dissociations in this atypical population, 
and thus they initiated this debate which is still ongoing. 
 
 
4.2 Studies on WS in the 1980s 
 
 In the 1980s, the research data on WS started to accumulate which intensified the 
controversy about intact language skills in the face of poor non-verbal cognition in WS. For 
example, contrary to the earlier studies, Kataria et al. (1984) did not report an advantage of 
verbal skills over gross motor skills in their study. Moreover, they did not confirm that WS 
individuals have an unusual command of language. Pagon et al. (1987) presented similar 
results as Kataria et al. (1984). They tested nine individuals with WS (aged between 10 and 
20) on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC; Wechsler, 1976) and reported 
that seven participants scored above the floor on the verbal scale (floor 45). The participants' 
verbal IQs were between 47 and 85. However, five of those seven also scored above the floor 
on the non-verbal tests where their scores ranged from 45 to 69. The ultimate differences 
between verbal and non-verbal scores of participants in this study did not reach statistical 
significance. Pagon et al. (1987) noted that only one participant from their study showed a 
significant verbal advantage which was statistically irrelevant. In addition, the data from 
another two studies, which used different IQ tests, showed no significant verbal advantage in 
WS individuals either. In one study, Crisco et al. (1988) administered the Illinois Test of 
Psycholinguistic Abilities to 22 children with WS, while in the other Greer et al. (1997) 
administered the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale to 15 WS subjects.  
 The data from work by Udwin and colleagues (Udwin & Yule, 1990, 1991; Udwin, 
Yule, & Martin, 1987) were not in accordance with the data from the Pagon et al.’s (1987) 
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study, even though they employed the same IQ measures, the WISC. In contrast to Pagon et 
al. (1987), however, Udwin and colleagues provided a much larger group of WS participants. 
They presented the data of 44 individuals with WS who were between 6 and 16 years of age. 
The scores of a small number of the participants were below the floor on both the verbal and 
non-verbal scales. However, the scores of the rest of the participants point to a statistically 
significant dominance of verbal IQs. The verbal IQs of the participants were between 45 and 
109 (mean 62.4), while their non-verbal IQs were between 45 and 73 (mean 55.9).  
 As we can see, most of the studies in the 1980s, which used standardized IQ tests in 
investigating WS population, did not discover major differences between their linguistic 
abilities and their other cognitive skills. The exceptions are the investigations of Udwin and 
colleagues (Udwin & Yule, 1990, 1991; Udwin, Yule, & Martin, 1987) who reported a rather 
marginal linguistic dominance. Bellugi et al. (1992), however, pointed out a problem with the 
standardized IQ measures used in these early studies on WS. They emphasized that the 
vocabulary tests of both the WISC and the Stanford-Binet scales require the participants to 
give a well-formed definition of words. Little or no credit was given for responding with 
broad descriptions or exemplars, which is usually the type of the response individuals with 
WS provide. In contrast, the formal vocabulary tests used during the 1990s and later on only 
require the participants to name a picture. The scores of individuals with WS on such tests are 
much higher (see section 4.3.4). Moreover, the vocabulary tests used in early studies include 
a comprehension subpart which involves practical problem-solving. Skills for problem-
solving are profoundly impaired in WS population (see section 4). Conversely, the 
comprehension part in the formal vocabulary tests used today requires only pointing to one 
out of four given pictures. All things considered, Bellugi et al. (1992) argued that the low 
scores of individuals with WS can be explained by the fact that the vocabulary tests used in 
early studies are not purely linguistic in nature. According to Bellugi et al. (1992), such 
vocabulary tests require metalinguistic knowledge, which places additional cognitive 
demands on WS subjects (for further discussion see section 6.2.2).  
 
 
4.3 Language studies on WS from the 1990s until today 
 
 From the 1990s onwards, the majority of the studies that investigated linguistic skills 
in WS were detailed experimental studies. Standardized IQ measures were only used to 
provide an initial assessment for the purposes of matching WS subjects to other control 
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groups. This new approach to WS research provided systematically measured data from all 
domains of WS language including syntax, morphology, phonology, lexical semantics, and 
pragmatics. In the following sections, each of these domains will be reviewed. We will see 
that the in-depth experimental investigations of WS language abilities have taken the 
modularity debate one step further, suggesting that the dissociation does not only exist on the 
cognitive level but also within the language itself. All the findings I incorporated in this 
review are the findings from various studies conducted on English speaking individuals with 
WS. 
 
4.3.1 Syntax in WS 
 
 In a number of studies, Bellugi and her collaborators (1988; 1994; 1999; 2000) argued 
that syntactic abilities are relatively strong in WS. These studies examined adolescents and 
adults with WS, whose results were contrasted with age- and IQ-matched individuals with 
Down syndrome (DS). Discussing their experimental data, Bellugi et al. (2000) stated that 
"the general cognitive impairment [found in individuals with WS] stands in stark contrast to 
their facility and ease in using sentences with complex syntax" (p. 12). Since this is not 
common in other mentally disabled groups, they proposed that syntactic skills in WS are 
"spared" or "relatively preserved". For instance, Bellugi et al. (1994) reported that the WS 
subjects have a much better comprehension of negative clauses, reversible passives, and 
conditionals than their DS matches. Also, they showed that individuals with WS perform 
significantly better than the DS matches when required to detect syntactic anomalies and to 
correct ungrammatical sentences. For example, when given semantically anomalous 
sentences or sentences violating transformational rules (e.g., subject-auxiliary inversion), the 
WS subjects were able to convert them into acceptable English sentences.  
 
Examiner:  The picture that painted the person was very kind.  
WS subject:  The picture that was painted by the man was very kind.  
 
Examiner:  Were delivered the flowers by the messenger?  
WS subject:  Were the flowers delivered by the messenger? 
 
        (Bellugi et al., 1988, p. 201) 
 
Similarly, Clahsen and Almazan (1998) reported that some more complex syntactic skills, 
such as the principle of binding, are intact in individuals with WS. In short, the principle of 
binding explains the syntactic conditioning of referential dependencies between anaphoric 
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elements (including personal and reflexive pronouns) and their antecedents (Chomsky, 1986). 
Binding Principle A regulates the distribution of reflexives, whereas Binding Principle B 
regulates the distribution of personal (non-reflexive) pronouns.  
 
Principle A: a reflexive must be locally bound, i.e. it must have a local 
antecedent.  
e.g., Mowglii is tickling himselfi /*j  j = Baloo bear 
 
Principle B: a pronoun must be locally free.  
e.g., Mowglii is tickling him*i /j  j = Baloo bear 
 
   (Adapted from Clahsen and Almazan, 1998) 
 
The experiment Clahsen and Almazan (1998) conducted involved a yes/no sentence-picture 
decision in which the test stimuli did or did not match with the pictures shown. The subjects 
were first introduced to the characters (Mowgli and Baloo Bear). The material used in the 
study were two pictures. In one picture Mowgli was tickling Baloo bear while in the other 
Mowgli was tickling himself. In the experiment, the subjects were presented with one of the 
two pictures and the experimenter asked, “Is Mowgli tickling him/himself?”. The subjects 
were requested to reply yes/no respectively. The results showed that the WS subjects 
performed at ceiling level in both syntactic tasks, like their TD controls.  
 Interestingly, however, it has not been shown yet that individuals with WS outperform 
typically developing (TD) controls in syntactic abilities when matched on mental age (MA). 
For example, Joffe and Valocosta (2007) showed that individuals with WS perform worse 
than MA-matched TD controls on comprehension of passive sentences and on production of 
wh-questions. Furthermore, Perovic and Wexler (2007) suggested that some complex aspects 
of grammar, particularly the aspects which are acquired later in typical development, may be 
unachievable for individuals with WS. This study examined two syntactic structures, binding 
and raising. The participants were divided into two groups of children with WS, a group of 6-
12 year olds and a group of 12-16 year olds. Their results were compared to the results of TD 
controls matched on non-verbal MA, verbal MA, and grammar. Ultimately, Perovic and 
Wexler (2007) reported that the knowledge of the principle of binding in both groups of 
children with WS was in line with the TD controls. However, they also reported that both 
groups of children with WS showed considerably poor comprehension of raised constructions 
(e.g., Homer seems to Lisa to be wearing a hat.) in contrast to unraised constructions (e.g., It 
seems to Lisa that Homer is wearing a hat.). Raising constructions involve moving (‘raising’) 
an argument from a lower non-finite sentence (embedded or subordinate clause) to the higher 
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subject position (of a matrix or main clause) (cf. Perovic and Wexler, 2007). Similarly to the 
above-mentioned binding experiment, Perovic and Wexler (2007) used a sentence-picture 
matching task to test the comprehension of the principle of raising in WS subjects. The 
subjects were requested to point to one of the two pictures that matched the sentence uttered 
by the experimenter. To convey the meaning of the raising verb, they used the graphic 
convention of thought bubbles. For example, the target picture that goes with the stimulus 
sentence ‘Homer seems to Lisa to be wearing a hat’ would present the character of Lisa with 
a thought bubble in which the other character, Homer, is depicted wearing a hat. Both WS 
groups who participated in this study showed very poor comprehension of sentences which 
involved raised constructions.  
Since the typical development suggests that the principle of binding is usually 
mastered until the age of 6 (see Guasti, 2002), while the principle of raising is not mastered 
before the age of 8 or 9 (see Hirsch & Wexler, in press), Perovic and Wexler (2007) 
suggested that syntactic abilities of WS population do not exceed the 7-year-old level of 
normal language development.  
 
4.3.2 Morphology in WS 
 
 Empirical data regarding morphology in WS mostly comes from the investigation of 
regular vs. irregular morphology (see Bromberg et al., 1994; Clahsen & Almazan, 1998; 
Thomas et al., 2001). Clashen and Almazan (1998) examined the use of English past tense 
formation. They tested only four children with WS (aged 11;2–15;4) and compared them with 
roughly matched TD controls on MA. The participants were tested on items of existing 
irregular verbs (e.g., swim, feed, drive, etc.), novel irregular verbs with stems which rhymed 
with existing irregulars (e.g., shrim (shram), cleed (cled), crive (crove)), existing regular 
verbs (e.g., flush, rush, look), and novel verbs with stems which do not rhyme with any 
existing irregular verb (e.g., spuff, dotch, cug). In the experiment, each verb was first 
presented in the context of a sentence where the experimenter said, e.g., “Every day I feed my 
dog”, Then, the experimenter started a second (test) sentence, e.g., “Just like every day, 
yesterday I ____ my dog”. Finally, the subject was asked to repeat this test sentence and to 
fill in the missing word. The final results of this study showed that, relative to their roughly 
matched TD controls, the WS subjects present a selective deficit in irregular past tense 
formation. Taking these results into consideration, Clashen and Almazan (1998) concluded 
that the use of regular morphology in WS individuals is intact, while their use of irregular 
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morphology is impaired. This dissociation between regular and irregular morphology, in a 
genetic disorder such as WS, has been interpreted as evidence that the innate language faculty 
consists of two mechanisms. One computational, rule-based mechanism responsible for the 
application of grammatical rules (such as ‘add -ed to regular verbs’, as in walk-walked), and 
one associative memory mechanism responsible for the retrieval of stored forms from the 
mental lexicon (as in sing-sang). Clahsen and Almazan (1998) thus argued that individuals 
with WS possess intact computational system (grammar), while their lexical system is 
impaired. 
 Thomas et al. (2001) used the same material as Clahsen and Almazan (1998), but a 
different approach to investigate the performance of WS subjects on English past tense 
formation. Their aim was to have a larger group of participants and to control for verbal MA 
between WS subjects and their TD controls. Basically, Thomas et al. (2001) employed a 
developmental trajectory approach when they analyzed the data from the study. 
Developmental trajectory approach suggests that it is vital to chart full developmental 
trajectory before analyzing study data (for the explanation of the term developmental 
trajectory see section 3.1.2). They examined 21 WS subjects, aged 10;11–53;3, mean 
chronological age (CA) 22;8 and mean general IQ 45. The performance of the WS subjects 
was contrasted with four different-age groups of TD controls: three groups of children (6, 8 
and 9-year-olds), and one group of adults (age range 17;3–45;0). The chart of these four TD 
groups demonstrated how the use of English past tense morphology changes across different 
ages (i.e. across different developmental times). At the age of 6, TD children show 
significantly better performance on regular morphology, relative to irregular morphology. 
Nevertheless, this difference decreases with their age. The same tendency is seen among the 
WS subjects. However, since the verbal MA of WS individuals is usually much lower than 
their CA, Thomas et al. (2001) matched the controls to their verbal MA as precisely as 
possible. Finally, by comparing the developmental trajectories of the WS subjects and their 
controls, Thomas et al. (2001) discovered that the WS subjects’ performance on English past 
tense formation was somewhere between the performance of the 6-year-old and 8-year-old 
group of TD controls, which was completely in line with their verbal MA. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that WS population shows better results in regular than in irregular past tense 
formation since the TD 6-year-olds show that as well.  
Thomas et al.’s study indicates how important it is to follow developmental 
trajectories when investigating atypical language acquisition. It also calls into question the 
hypothesis that WS individuals can be taken as evidence for the existence of two separate 
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mechanisms of the language faculty. According to this study, the selective deficit in irregular 
past tense formation of WS individuals is only the result of their low verbal MA. 
 
4.3.3 Phonology and prosody in WS 
 
 Phonological abilities in WS have been of little interest to researchers so far. This is 
probably because the vast majority of WS population displays fluent and well-articulated 
speech, unlike other intellectually challenged populations. The articulatory problems, such as 
the mispronunciation of tricky multisyllabic words or phrases and stuttering, are infrequent 
(Udwin and Yule, 1990).  
In contrast to the phonological abilities, the prosodic abilities of individuals with WS 
have attracted more attention. For example, Reilly et al. (1990) tested a small group of 
adolescents with WS and with DS on a story-telling task “Frog where are you?”. From their 
performance, they evaluated that adolescents with WS use far more affective-expressive 
prosody in contrast to adolescents with DS. The evaluations were made based on the analysis 
of the sentences produced by the participants during story telling. Several instances of 
affective vocal prosody were looked at: pitch changes, vocalic lengthening, and modifications 
in volume. The example of one such evaluation of WS affective prosody is the following: 
 
                  
       (Reilly et al., 1990, p. 379) 
 
As we can see, this evaluation was based on impressionistic data only, no instrumental 
measuring was used. Setter et al. (2007) conducted a larger, instrumental study, where they 
measured acoustic variables in the speech of the participants. Their aim was to compare the 
pitch range and vowel durations of WS children to those of TD children and to find out 
whether children with WS are perceived differently to CA and LA (receptive language 
abilities) matches by a group of phonetically naïve listeners. As the material for the 
experiment, they used the same story telling task (“Frog where are you?”) as Reilly et al. 
(1990). They found out the following. First, with the use Laryngograph, they discovered that 
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WS group had much higher as well as wider pitch range than either of the two TD groups 
(CA and LA). Second, the spectrographic analysis of vowel durations showed that the 
children with WS used similar vowel durations as the LA control group. This indicates that 
WS individuals may be delayed in comparison to TD children of their own age in this aspect 
of speech. And third, the naïve listeners recruited for the study perceived the speech of WS 
subjects as much more emotionally involved than the speech of TD children of a similar LA 
and CA. Thus, the results are consistent with the proposals from the study by Reilly et al. 
(1990).  
 The fact that individuals with WS show different performance from younger TD 
controls on two aspects of speech (pitch range and the intensity of emotional involvement), 
indicates that their prosodic development is atypical. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the neuroconstructivist view (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998), which suggests that, when the 
development of cognition is disturbed by a gene mutation (as is in WS), the brain starts to 
follow an atypical trajectory (in order to adapt itself), which can consequently create an 
uneven development of different cognitive skills (see section 3.1.1). However, this view does 
not exclude the chance that some aspects of development in WS population will resemble 
those seen in typical development, even if the developmental path was different. If we 
assumed that development in WS is just delayed, but follows a typical trajectory, then WS 
individuals should perform in an identical way as younger TD children on any cognitive task. 
According to the data from the two above reviewed studies, this is not the case with prosodic 
skills of WS population.  
 
4.3.4 Semantics and pragmatics in WS 
 
 Judging by the huge corpus of literature on WS in the field of semantics, lexical 
abilities of WS population have intrigued researchers the most. This may be due to the fact 
that receptive vocabulary is one of the aspects of language in which individuals with WS tend 
to perform better than it would be expected by their MA (Bellugi et al., 1988; Rossen et al., 
1996; Clahsen et al., 2004). Namely, various formal vocabulary tests (e.g., the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R), the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS), 
and the Gardner Expressive One Word Vocabulary Test (EOWPVT)) demonstrate that the 
vocabulary performance of adolescents and adults considerably surpasses their overall MA 
(Bellugi et al., 1988; Rossen et al., 1996; Tyler et al., 1997; Mervis et al., 1999). This is 
surprising because it is a unique example among groups with mental disorders (Reilly et al., 
24 
 
1990). However, Volterra et al. (1996) who investigated younger children with WS (9-, 10-
year-olds) reported that their vocabulary skills do not appear so extraordinary at this age. 
Instead, Volterra et al. (1996) pointed to an initial delay in receptive vocabulary in children 
with WS, relative to their TD controls matched on MA. The advantage of individuals with 
WS, in contrast to the vocabulary skills of DS individuals, becomes noticeable only in their 
early adolescence (Rossen et al., 1996). Therefore, Rossen et al. (1996) suggested that the 
remarkable vocabulary in adolescents and adults with WS are a result of developmental 
changes, not a result of intact language ability.   
 Even though individuals with WS display a very rich vocabulary, their lexical skills 
do not seem entirely normal. For example, Bellugi et al., 1994 reported that individuals with 
WS have an unusual choice of words (e.g., "I will have to evacuate the glass", meaning I’ll 
have to empty the glass [p. 32]). They also argued that individuals with WS use a lot more 
low-frequency words than either DS or TD children (e.g., when asked to name as many 
animals as they know, some of their answers were "yak", “chihuahua” "ibex", "newt" [p. 
32]). Furthermore, Bellugi et al. (1988) noted some unusual responses that individuals with 
WS provided on a word-definition task (e.g., “Sad is when someone dies; someone is hurt, 
like when you cry” [p. 197). These various findings have led to the hypothesis that lexical-
semantic processing in WS is impaired or atypical (see Rossen et al., 1996; Bellugi et al., 
1988, 1994). 
Some of the recent studies challenged the hypotheses that individuals with WS 
possess abnormal vocabularies. Several studies revealed that, when the conversational 
context is controlled for, i.e. when the individuals with WS are required to talk about a 
specific topic, instead of the topics they are specially interested in (e.g., animals), they neither 
use many unusual words nor do they use more low-frequency words than it would be 
predicted for their level of general intelligence (Volterra et al., 1996; Jarrold et al., 2000; 
Stojanovik and van Ewijk, 2008;). 
Figurative speech is another interesting area in WS language research. Studies 
concerning this domain have reported that most of the WS subjects can properly use and 
interpret metaphors, idioms, similes and other simple forms of figurative language. However, 
although they demonstrate the ability to understand word meaning and concepts that are 
relatively concrete, studies have found that the vast majority of them present difficulties with 
understanding more complex forms of figurative language, such as the words with multiple, 
ambiguous or abstract meanings (Annaz et al., 2009; Mervis et al., 2003). 
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Last but not least, it is important to mention investigations regarding pragmatic 
abilities in WS. Initially, researchers noted that individuals with WS are “loquacious” (Arnim 
& Engel, 1964), “highly social” (Reilly et al., 1990), that their communicative skills are 
“impressive” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), and that they possess “relative strength in expressive 
language” (Morris et al., 1988). However, more recent studies have indicated that the 
remarkable expressiveness of WS population can hide many deficits in their pragmatics (see 
Jones et al., 2000; Laws & Bishop, 2004; Stojanovik, 2006). 
The expressive language of individuals with WS is usually examined via story telling 
tasks and interviews. Story telling tasks revealed that, unlike DS and TD individuals, 
individuals with WS use a lot of evaluation devices (i.e., ‘audience hookers’, e.g., “Guess 
what happened next?”, “Suddenly”, “Lo and behold”) to engage their listeners (Rossen et al., 
1996, p. 373). In addition, their narratives are usually long and descriptive, although less 
coherent and less complex than the narratives of their TD matches (Gonçalves et al., 2011). 
Interviews, on the other hand, discovered, more vulnerability in the pragmatics of WS 
population. For example, Laws and Bishop (2004) showed that individuals with WS use 
significantly more stereotyped phrases in communication than children with DS or SLI. 
Stojanovik (2006) identified the lack of proper interaction in communication in WS subjects. 
She reported that children with WS often have difficulties responding appropriately to 
interlocutor’s questions, providing or requesting relevant information, and clarifying their 
responses, if needed. She also noted that they sometimes even have trouble staying on a topic 
of conversation. However, they also have an overwhelming need for social interaction, so 
they will do anything to keep the conversation going (Jones et al., 2000).  
 
4.4 Summary 
 
 It is evident from the above-reviewed studies that there is a lack of consensus in the 
literature findings on language advantage over other cognitive domains in individuals with 
WS. We can also see an inconsistency in data on strengths and weaknesses within the 
different language domains in WS population. The exact basis for these discrepancies is yet 
to be found. However, it seems apparent that the use of different instruments for 
measurement and evaluation of language skills in WS can deliver different results. The 
differences might depend on the degree of cognitive demands that the chosen instrument 
places on WS subjects. For instance, we saw that the standardized vocabulary tests used in 
the earlier studies on WS were more demanding than the ones used in more recent studies. 
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Furthermore, the inconsistencies in data from the within-language studies can suggest the 
linguistic heterogeneity of WS population. In such case, every endeavor to characterize WS 
language profile as one homogeneous linguistic profile might be questionable (see Stojanovik 
et al., 2006). In addition, since all the language studies reviewed in this chapter include the 
investigations on English speaking individuals with WS, cross-linguistic studies would be 
useful in providing more information from each language domain. For example, languages 
with the high degree of inflections might reveal more precise information about WS strengths 
and weaknesses in the domain of morphology. Nevertheless, several conclusions about 
language in WS can be drawn from this review. First, the studies conducted on younger 
children with WS confirm that the language acquisition in WS population is delayed, relative 
to typical language acquisition. Second, the investigations of WS syntactic abilities imply that 
individuals with WS, even though significantly better in this domain than other mentally 
disabled groups, probably do not exceed the language development of a 7-year-old child. 
Third, the investigations (using developmental trajectory approach) of WS morphological 
skills indicate that the development of morphology also plateaus at the age of 7. Since the 
developmental trajectory of TD individuals shows that the normal development of irregular 
morphology continues even after that age, the hypothesis that WS is evidence for the 
existence of the two separate mechanisms of language faculty is arguable. Fourth, the 
investigations of WS vocabulary skills show us that the WS child’s performance differs from 
the WS adult performance in these language domains. Namely, the performance of 
individuals with WS in these domains is much poorer in childhood than in adulthood, when 
compared to the performance of individuals with DS. This again shows how important it is to 
chart full developmental trajectories in order to properly analyze atypical language 
development. Fifth, the studies of prosodic skills in WS indicate that the language of WS in 
not only delayed but also follows an atypical developmental path. Lastly, the investigations 
of WS pragmatic abilities suggest that the remarkable expressiveness and enormous social 
drive of individuals with WS conceal many deficits in their language.  
In the following chapter, I will further investigate whether WS children follow the 
same language development as normal children. I will do so by discussing the findings from 
different language studies on individuals with WS and comparing them to the data from the 
literature on typical language development. Since covering every aspect of language would 
exceed the scope of this paper, I decided to focus on vocabulary acquisition. I chose this 
aspect of language specifically because the development of vocabulary can be followed from 
the very early age. 
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5 The onset of vocabulary acquisition  
 
Although it seems that children learn to speak very quickly and almost effortlessly,  
learning language is not an easy task. In the past, linguists used to place the onset of language 
at about twelve months, when children start to produce their first identifiable words. 
Innovative research techniques, however, show that language roots can be found much earlier 
than that. In fact, language acquisition is said to start in mother's womb, continues throughout 
childhood, and lasts even beyond adolescence (e.g. see Karmiloff-Smith, 2001). During this 
long journey of language acquisition, the vast majority of children successfully deal with 
various challenges. But what happens if the infant brain processing is affected by a gene 
abnormality? Can language stay relatively spared even though the general cognition is 
severely impaired due to a gene mutation? In the previous chapter, we saw that the language 
of individuals with WS is hypothesized to be one such example. The linguistic performance 
of WS individuals on various vocabulary tests is significantly better than their mental age 
would predict. But does this necessarily mean that individuals with WS follow normal 
language development from its earliest milestones? In order to investigate this, I will compare 
the research findings on early vocabulary acquisition of children with WS to the research 
findings on early vocabulary acquisition of TD children. Ideally, the comparison (between 
WS individuals and TD individuals) should begin with the studies that have been done on 
very young infants. However, researchers have been unable to test young infants with WS 
due to the medical problems they face in their early months of life. Therefore, this 
comparison will begin with studies that investigated infants at approximately 10 months of 
age. First, I will discuss how the pre-linguistic behaviors of infants with WS differ from the 
pre-linguistic behaviors of TD infants. In section 5.2, I will talk about lexical constraints 
which help TD children recognize a word meaning, and then show how these lexical 
constraints function in children with WS. Lastly, in section 5.3, I will compare the occurrence 
of vocabulary spurt in TD children and children with WS. 
 
 
5.1 Pre-linguistic skills 
 
 Vocabulary acquisition is one of the first challenges every child faces. According to 
the social-pragmatic approach to language acquisition, “the process of word learning is 
constrained by the child’s general understanding of what is going on in the situation in which 
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she hears a new word” (Tomasello & Akhtar, 2000, p. 5). In other words, in order to build 
vocabulary, the infant must find a way to discern what the utterances she hears are referring 
to. To do so, she has to be able to analyze the linguistic input, but also to make use of the 
non-linguistic cues which indicate to objects or actions around her. In this complex task of 
disambiguating meaning, any clues available, such as pointing or movement of the specific 
object into child's focus of attention, is helpful. From the social-pragmatic point of view, pre-
linguistic skills infants display, such as referential pointing and the establishment of joint 
attention, are strongly related to the onset of normal lexical development.  
 
5.1.1 Referential pointing 
 
 Referential pointing together with babbling is considered to be one of the first signs of 
infants’ communication. Pointing towards an object or an action (that is being referred to in a 
conversation) can come from either an adult (parent, caregiver, etc.) or from the child. In 
normal development, the child's ability to understand the referential pointing of others comes 
prior to her own ability to point. Infants will look at the object being pointed at when they are 
approximately nine months old, while their own referential pointing will begin by ten months 
of age (Murphy & Messer, 1977). Typically developing children begin to point at objects in 
the environment several weeks before they can produce their first words. Pointing towards an 
object enables the child to draw the adult's attention to it, which in return usually elicits 
labeling from the adult. This helps the child to comprehend some words before she is able to 
produce them orally. Referential or declarative pointing, thus, can be explained as a substitute 
for the infant's ability to name objects at the early stage of language development (Paterson, 
2000).  
Several studies on WS have shown that, unlike TD infants, infants with WS do not 
point towards objects or actions before they produce their first words. Mervis and Bertrand 
(1997) reported that referential pointing in children with WS appears approximately six 
months after their first spoken word. They also noted that in contrast to TD 9-month-olds, 
children with WS do not respond to the pointing of others either. Furthermore, Laing et al. 
(2002) examined whether the lack of pointing in WS children could be caused by the 
impairments in fine motor skills. They discovered that, despite the lack of pointing, children 
with WS did exhibit pincer grip. As Butterworth and Morissette’s (1996) study demonstrated, 
TD children use pincer grips before they begin to point. Since this relationship between 
pincer grip and pointing is not the same for the children with WS, Laing et al. (2002) 
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suggested that the lack of pointing found in children with WS could not be caused by the 
impairments in fine motor skills. Especially because a pincer grip, per se, requires much more 
precision than pointing. Thus, the lack of pointing in WS can rather be interpreted as the lack 
of understanding of non-linguistic referential clues at this early stage of the language 
development. 
 
5.1.2 Joint attention 
 
Referential pointing is a medium of establishing joint attention between the child and 
an adult. Plainly speaking, joint attention refers to a situation when a child and adult are 
focused on the same thing (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011). Baldwin (1995) argued that during 
this process both of the participants need to be aware that the focus of attention is shared.  
 
5.1.2.1   Dyadic versus triadic interaction 
 
It is very important that we understand a distinction between dyadic and triadic 
interaction. Dyadic interaction involves the simple eye contact between the child and her 
interlocutor. On the other hand, triadic interaction, or joint attention, includes triadic 
coordination between the child, his interlocutor, and an object or an action. Joint attention 
goes beyond child’s initial ability to participate in a face-to-face dyad (Laing et al., 2002). 
The skills that the child needs to possess in order to be able to coordinate a moment of joint 
attention are gaze shifting, reaching, and referential pointing with babbling. Normally, these 
skills that eventually render joint attention emerge during the period of 6 and 18 months of 
age (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). Moreover, joint attention can be initiated and responded 
to by either of the participants of the dyad (Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2007). 
Many investigations on TD children demonstrated that the child’s ability to engage in 
joint attention is related to her subsequent language acquisition. Probably the most famous 
experimental study of joint attention in word learning is the one conducted by Baldwin 
(1993). He tested three different-age groups of children (1;2-1;3, 1;4-1;5, 1;6-1;7). All 
children were first presented with two toys, and then they were given one to play with. The 
other toy remained with the experimenter. One half of the children from the each group was 
involved in a direct labeling condition, while the other half was involved in a discrepant 
labeling condition. In the direct labeling condition, the experimenter looked at the toy the 
child was playing with and said, e.g., It’s a toma. In the discrepant labeling condition, the 
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experimenter looked at his own toy when he produced labeling, while the child was still 
attending his/her own toy. After the initial session, all children were asked which toy was a 
toma. The children from the direct labeling condition all correctly associated the word toma 
with the toy they were playing with. The children from the discrepant labeling condition 
responded differently depending on their age. The youngest group made significantly more 
incorrect associations, while the group aged 1;4–1;5 was at chance. However, the experiment 
showed that 77% of children aged 1;6–1;7 correctly associated a novel word to a toy even 
when the toy the experimenter was referring to was not the one they were attending to. Thus, 
Baldwin reported that TD children are able to interpret other’s people intentions by carefully 
following the direction of their eye gaze. He argued that starting from approximately 16–18 
months of age TD children understand enough about joint attention so that it can block their 
incorrect mapping of a word to its referent. These findings indicate that TD children make 
use of non-linguistic cues to interpret the referential context of communication. Moreover, a 
longitudinal study conducted by Carpenter et al. (1998) investigated a large group of TD 
children (aged 9-15 months) and revealed a positive correlation between the amount of time 
mothers and their children spent in joint attention engagement and the size of the children’s 
early vocabulary. 
On the other hand, children with WS seem to be impaired in establishing joint 
attention. Laing et al. (2002) tested joint attention skills of 13 toddlers with WS, aged 17-55 
months. The results of the experiment showed that the participants with WS were able to 
engage only in dyadic interaction. Contrary to a control group of TD toddlers matched on 
MA, toddlers with WS showed the absence of ability to either initiate or to respond to joint 
attention. Bertrand et al. (1993) conducted a longitudinal study in which they investigated 
joint attention skills of only one girl with WS. She was observed from the age of 1;8 to 2;8. 
The study reported that the girl did not start to engage in joint attention until well after the 
vocabulary spurt. Moreover, they noted that she showed little interest in toys used in the 
study. Instead of playing with the given toys, she preferred to focus on the experimenter’s 
face, which was consequently a distractor for establishing a triadic interaction. Thus, since 
toddlers with WS appear to be incapable of engaging in joint attention before they start to 
produce words, there must be some other way they initially establish lexical reference. 
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5.2. Lexical Constraints 
 
Although the ability to employ non-verbal cues, such as pointing or joint attention 
gives toddlers a head start in word learning, these cues may not always be available or may 
not be enough. If there are no explicit clues, how do children figure out the meaning of a 
spoken word? Every word can have an indefinite number of possible meanings and “[i]f 
children had to consider, evaluate, and rule out an unlimited number of hypotheses about 
each word in order to figure out its meaning, learning word meanings would be hopeless” 
(Markman, 1990, p. 57). Markman (1990) identifies the problem of vocabulary acquisition as 
the problem of induction.  According to her, children assume that words are used in certain 
ways. These default assumptions are called lexical constraints. Lexical constraints guide 
children to learn words by offering them a limited number of hypotheses they should consider 
as possible word meanings. Markman (1990) suggests three possible constraints on word 
meanings:  
 
(1) The whole object assumption which leads children to interpret novel 
terms as labels for objects - not parts, substances, or other properties of 
objects  
(2) The taxonomic assumption which leads children to consider labels as 
referring to objects of like kind, rather than to objects that are thematically 
related  
(3) The mutual exclusivity assumption which leads children to expect each 
object to have only one label.  
(p. 57) 
 
These lexical constraints help children rule out a number of possible assumptions regarding 
word’s meaning. However, they cannot entirely solve the problem of word learning. They are 
only assumed to be a part of the early word learning mechanism, thus, as children grow 
lexical constraints fade away or become replaced with some other learning mechanism. 
Moreover, Markman (1990) does not explicitly say whether she considers these lexical 
constraints to be innate, although she does refer to them as “possessed knowledge”. Thus, it is 
not exactly clear whether the lexical constraint approach to vocabulary acquisition is a 
nativist approach. 
 
5.2.1 The whole object assumption  
 
The whole object constraint guides the child to assume that a novel word refers to a 
whole object rather than to its parts or to the materials it is made of. Thus, when the child 
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hears a word rabbit (possibly in the presence of a rabbit) she will infer that this word refers to 
a rabbit as a whole, not to the rabbit’s tail, paws or its fur (cf. Ambridge & Lieven, 2011). 
Markman and Wachtel (1988) conducted a study on TD children aged 3;0–4;3 in 
which they demonstrated that children associate novel words with whole objects and not with 
the parts of these objects. In the study, children were shown pictures of unfamiliar objects 
(e.g., a lung) and given an unfamiliar label (e.g., bronchus). On the request to say “Which 
one is the bronchus?” the whole thing (experimenter circles the whole lung) or just this part 
(experimenter points to the bronchus) 80% of the children chose “the whole thing”. This is 
interpreted as evidence that children operate with the whole object constraint during their 
word learning process. 
Stevens and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) replicated and extended the study by Markman 
and Wachtel (1988). Their aim was to test whether lexical constraints on word learning could 
be found in WS individuals. The experimental group consisted of 14 WS subjects whose CA 
ranged from 7;5 to 31;5 (mean 20;1). Their vocabulary MA ranged from 6;8–16;4 (mean 
9;11) whereas their non-verbal MA ranged from 3;6–9;0 (mean 6;4). The results of the 
experimental group were contrasted with the results of four TD control groups (a group of 3-, 
5-, 7- and 9-year-olds). In regard to TD control, Stevens and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) reported 
that the results from all four groups were comparable to the results from the Markman and 
Wachtel’s (1988) study. TD children across all ages from 3 to 9 years seem to be guided by 
the rule of the whole object constraint. On the other hand, the picture for the WS subjects was 
very different. Unlike in TD controls, the whole object constraint does not seem to be present 
in WS subjects. They were randomly choosing both “the whole object” and “a part of the 
object” options. In other words, WS subjects showed no significant difference in favor of “the 
whole object” responses. This suggests that, relative to normal development, the vocabulary 
acquisition of WS individuals is not constrained by the whole object bias. 
 
5.2.2 The taxonomic assumption 
 
After establishing that a label (e.g., shoe) refers to a whole object (e.g., the child’s 
own shoe) the child has to figure out how to extend it to other objects (e.g., her mother’s 
shoe). This is not an easy task. The child must figure out that the label (shoe) she learned can 
refer to other objects ‘of the same kind’ (e.g., a high-heeled shoe, a sandal, etc.). In this 
endeavor, children are guided by the taxonomic constraint (cf. Ambridge & Lieven, 2011).  
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In theory, a label might be extended to objects that are related either thematically, 
where objects are linked by causal, temporal, spatial or some other theme (e.g., shoes and 
feet, cows and milk, etc.), or taxonomically, where objects are linked by the same taxonomic 
category (e.g., dogs, cows, and rabbits all belong to the same taxonomic category of 
animals). However, experimental studies have shown that children favor extending labels to 
objects that are taxonomically related (cf. Ambridge & Lieven, 2011; Guasti, 2002). 
Markman and Hutchinson (1984) tested 4- and 5-year-olds in an experiment in which 
two groups of children were assigned two different conditions: the no-word condition and the 
novel-word condition. In both conditions, participants were first shown a target toy (e.g., a 
police car). Then, two other toys were placed next to the target toy, one on the right and the 
other one on the left. One toy was thematically related to the target toy (e.g., a policeman), 
whereas the other was an object that belongs to the same superordinate category as the target 
toy (e.g., a truck). In the no-word condition, the participants were shown the target toy, and 
the experimenter asked, “See this?” Then, he showed the two other toys and asked, “Can you 
find another one?” In the novel word condition, the experimenter pointed to the target toy and 
labeled it with the nonsense word by saying, e.g., “This is wug”. Then he placed the other two 
toys on the table, and while holding the target toy, he would say, “Can you find another wug 
that is the same as this?” If labeling stimulates children to choose the object of the same kind, 
it can be supposed that in the no-word condition children would randomly choose either the 
thematically or the taxonomically related toy, while in the novel-word condition they would 
be biased towards the taxonomically related toy. The results from the Markman and 
Hutchinson’s (1984) experiment showed that the children who were assigned the no-word 
condition made a taxonomic choice only 25% of the time, whereas the children who were 
assigned the novel-word condition made a taxonomic choice 65% of the time. Since the 
distinction between the two conditions was the presence versus the absence of a label for the 
objects, Markman and Hutchinson (1984) concluded that the presence of the novel word 
invites children to relate objects taxonomically rather than thematically. This further suggests 
that the process of word learning in TD children is constrained by the taxonomic bias. 
Let us now see what studies have found concerning the taxonomic constraint in 
individuals with WS. Steven and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) conducted a similar experiment as 
the one of Markman and Hutchinson (1984) mentioned above. They tested 12 WS subjects 
aged 8;6–30;11 (mean 19,9). Their vocabulary MA was assessed to be in the range 4;5–16;4 
(mean: 9;1) while their non-verbal mental age was assessed to be in the range 3;6–8;3 (mean: 
5;4). TD controls were divided into two groups: a group of three-year-olds and a group of 
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nine-year-olds. The results in relation to the TD children confirmed the Markman and 
Hutchinson’s (1984) findings. Namely, both groups of TD controls showed a significant 
advantage of taxonomically related choices over the thematically related choices in the 
presence of a novel word, as opposed to the no-word condition. Contrary to TD children, 
there was no significant difference in the responses of WS subjects between the no-word 
condition and the novel-word condition. That is, no greater number of taxonomic responses 
was made in either of the conditions. Therefore, Steven and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) argue 
that the individuals with WS lack the taxonomic constraint. However, they report that there 
were a few individual cases of WS subjects who did show a taxonomic bias. The surprising 
fact was that those subjects did not have better vocabulary scores than the rest of the subjects 
who did not show a taxonomic bias. This finding indicates that WS individuals can acquire 
relatively good levels of vocabulary even though their vocabulary development is not guided 
by the taxonomic constraint.  
 
5.2.3 The mutual exclusivity assumption 
 
 We have seen that children initially assume that a novel word refers to the whole 
object. However, they eventually have to learn words that refer to the part of the objects. As 
Markman (1990) argues, this is the moment when the whole object constraint must be 
superseded by the new assumption. Namely, if the child had already learned that the word  
rabbit refers to the rabbit that stands in front of her, she would assume that a novel word 
uttered in the presence of the rabbit (e.g., tail) is a label that refers to some part of the rabbit, 
not the rabbit itself. This assumption is defined by the mutual exclusivity constraint. 
The mutual exclusivity constraint guides children to assume that “each object will 
have one and only one label” (Markman, 1990, p. 66). The assumption that words are not 
synonymous may be initially helpful in vocabulary acquisition. However, we know that a 
single object can be referred to both with its own label and with the label of the categories it 
belongs to (e.g., a parrot is also a pet, an animal, and a bird). For this reason, at one point of 
their vocabulary acquisition, children must supersede the mutual exclusivity constraint as 
well.  
As it was mentioned earlier, the constraints Markman (1990) proposes cannot entirely 
solve the induction problem of vocabulary acquisition. The proposed constraints are not 
absolute prohibitions. They are only tendencies of children to favor certain choices at the 
very start of their vocabulary acquisition. In other words, they only help children limit the 
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indefinite number of hypotheses for possible word meanings that is imposed on them at the 
onset of their vocabulary development. Other than that, the scope of these constraints is very 
restricted. For example, they cannot clarify how children acquire the meaning of abstract 
objects, verbs, and prepositions (cf. Ambridge & Lieven, 2011; Guasti, 2002).  
Let us now return to the mutual exclusivity constraint to see how TD children deal 
with it in practice. Similarly to the above-mentioned experiment on the whole object 
constraint, Markman and Wachtel (1988) conducted the study on 3- and 4-year-olds to 
investigate the influence of the mutual exclusivity constraint. This time, however, the 
participants were not presented with the picture of an unfamiliar object. Instead, they were 
first taught the name for the unfamiliar object in the picture (e.g., lung) which was later used 
in the experiment. Thus, in the initial training, the experimenter gave a short presentation to 
each child by saying, e.g. “This is a lung. People have two lungs in their body, and they use 
them for breathing.”  The rest of the study followed the same procedure as the whole object 
constraint study. Children were presented with the picture from the training, and the 
experimenter asked about, e.g. “Which one is a bronchus? The whole thing [experimenter 
circles whole lung] or just this part [points to the bronchus].” The results showed that 
children chose “just this part” in 85% of the time. Therefore, the evidence shows that children 
successfully override the whole object constraint when a novel word is uttered in the presence 
of a familiar object. 
Steven and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) investigated the mutual exclusivity constraint in 
WS population. Their study included 10 WS subjects who were 8;0–30;5 years of age (mean: 
19;6). The vocabulary MA of these subjects was in the range 6;8–16;4 (mean: 9;9) whereas 
their non-verbal MA was between 5;3 and 11;0 (mean: 7;6). The results were contrasted with 
the two groups of TD controls: a younger group of three-year-olds and the older group of 
nine-year-olds. The procedure of the experiment was the same as in the Markman and 
Wachtel’s (1988) study. The study demonstrated that, like the TD controls, the WS group 
successfully excluded the possibility that the familiar object (for which they already have a 
label) can have another label and therefore demonstrated that they are sensitive to mutual 
exclusivity constraint. These results are somewhat surprising. We have seen earlier in this 
chapter that WS individuals are not sensitive to either the whole object constraint or to the 
taxonomic constraint. However, the mutual exclusivity constraint seems to be present in their 
word learning process in the same way as it is in the TD controls.  
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5.3 Vocabulary Spurt 
 
Most children start to produce first words by their first birthday. At that age, their 
expressive vocabulary usually consists of three to four different words. From then on, the 
number of new words in their vocabulary slowly grows until they reach about 75-150 words. 
At this point, there is a sudden increase in the rate at which new words are acquired. This 
occurrence is characterized as the vocabulary spurt (cf. Ambridge & Lieven, 2011).  
Gopnik and Maltzoff (1987) noted that the explosion in vocabulary acquisition occurs 
when the child is about 18 months old. They also argued that this experience coincides with 
the development of certain cognitive abilities, such as spontaneous exhaustive sorting. 
Spontaneous exhaustive sorting refers to the child’s ability to sort the objects that belong to a 
particular category. Furthermore, Mervis and Bertrand (1994) argue that the vocabulary spurt 
is strongly related to children’s fast mapping ability. Fast mapping means that the child is 
able to map novel words to objects for which she still does not have a name. For example, if 
three objects lie on the table, two familiar and one unfamiliar, the child will pick up the 
unfamiliar one on hearing a novel name. This realization that all objects should have a name 
is called Novel Name – Nameless Category (N3C) principle. Before children start to use this 
principle, they can only rely on other people who assist them in mapping by explicitly 
providing a connection between a new word and its referent. For instance, pointing to an 
object and labeling it at the same time or labeling an object that the child is already attending 
to. However, when children acquire the N3C principle they no longer need to rely on adults 
to provide an explicit connection between a label and its referent. In other words, even if the 
direct connection is not given, the child is still able to map a novel label to an object that is 
present, but for which she does not yet have a name.  
Gopnik and Meltzoff, (1987) found that 16-20 month children who were able to sort 
various objects into categories could also use the N3C principle, whereas the ones who could 
not sort spontaneously had not yet begun to fast map. They explained that these two abilities 
(spontaneous exhaustive sorting and fast mapping) occur at the same time because they 
reflect parallel insights, one insight being cognitive (all objects belong to some category) and 
the other insight being linguistic (all objects have a name). Finally, it seems that when these 
to abilities meet the vocabulary starts to grow rapidly. 
In contrast to typical development, children with WS do not produce first words 
before the age of 2. However, the vocabulary spurt in WS children often appears long before 
their ability to sort objects into categories. In fact, it was found that the onset of the 
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vocabulary spurt in WS children occurs 6–12 months prior to the emergence of exhaustive 
sorting (Paterson, 2000). Mervis et al., 1997, reported that some WS children had a 
vocabulary size of more than 500 words before they displayed the ability to spontaneously 
sort objects into categories. Despite these discrepancies, Steven and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) 
demonstrated that once WS children began to use spontaneous exhaustive sorting, they were 
also capable of fast mapping, which demonstrates that these two abilities (one cognitive and 
one linguistic) are indeed closely related. 
As it appears, children with WS learn word labels before understanding how to map 
those labels to objects. This suggests that WS individuals might be memorizing the 
phonological sequences of words while their referential understanding of those words might 
be very limited. In other words, they might be focusing less on semantics and more on 
phonology in their early vocabulary development, in contrast to TD children (Mervis et al., 
1997). 
 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
The comparison of the literature on vocabulary acquisition presented above points to 
some clear differences in the way WS and TD language develops in the early stages. We saw 
that the social-interaction skills (such as referential pointing and the establishment of joint 
attention) play an important role in helping TD infants make associations between social 
referencing and language. These skills do not seem to function in the same way in WS 
infants. Referential pointing, which TD infants use to request labeling for things around them, 
appears quite late in the WS development. In fact, it appears after the onset of their language 
production, which is not the case in normal development. Since the possibility that the lack of 
pointing is caused by fine motor impairments is excluded, we are left to speculate whether or 
not WS infants comprehend non-linguistic referential clues at this early stage of the language 
development. Another useful pre-linguistic behavior that typically helps children associate 
words with their meanings is the ability to establish joint attention. Although WS individuals 
are described as very sociable, this characteristic might have some negative influence on their 
language development. WS individuals tend to be obsessed with people’s faces which usually 
draws their attention away from other things happening around them. In this way, they fail to 
engage in joint attention which is, according to social-pragmatic view, very important for the 
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normal onset of vocabulary development since it can give initial clues for the correlation 
between words and their references. It is possible that the lack of pre-linguistic skills slows 
down the language acquisition of WS individuals which would explain the delay in the onset. 
However, the insensitivity of older children and adults with WS to lexical constraints 
indicates that WS individuals continue to follow a different path in vocabulary acquisition. If 
we assume that lexical constraints are the part of the innate linguistic knowledge, or as 
Markman (1990) describes them “possessed knowledge”, we can see that WS individuals do 
not rely much on that knowledge in their vocabulary acquisition. The above-reviewed studies 
show that while all TD children between 3 and 9 years of age display fast mapping and make 
use of the whole object, the taxonomic and  the mutual exclusivity constraints, WS 
individuals are only sensitive to mutual exclusivity and fast mapping. Are these two biases 
enough for normal language development? Further research is needed to discover that.  
Taking both pre-linguistic behaviors and lexical constraints into consideration, it is 
clear that TD children acquire words only after they establish some kind of semantic relation 
between labels they hear and objects that exist in their environment. If WS children fail to do 
so, how can we explain their remarkable scores on vocabulary tests in adolescence and 
adulthood? Some studies indicate that people with WS rely more on phonology than on 
semantics when they learn new words (see Grant et al., 1997; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1997; 
Laing et al., 2001). Moreover, many studies point to the fact that lexico-semantic processing 
in WS population is aberrant (Bellugi et al., 1988, 1994; Rossen et al., 1996; Udwin et al., 
1987; Volterra et al., 1996; Neville, Mills, & Bellugi, 1994; Neville, Holcomb, & Mills, 
1989). In the next chapter, I will first review some of these studies. Then, I will introduce a 
study that suggested that, even though the semantic processing in WS is might be different 
than in normal language development, the semantic information in WS individuals is 
organized in the same way as in TD individuals (Tyler et al., 1997). Lastly, I will discuss 
what such findings might say about the connection between language and the rest of the 
cognition.  
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6. Production vs. Comprehension 
 
 Although significantly delayed and very poor at the beginning, once the vocabulary of 
individuals with WS starts to develop it gradually improves. By the time the individuals with 
WS reach adulthood, they have built up an impressive size of vocabulary. Adult WS language 
is often characterized as being filled with elaborate and “erudite-sounding” vocabulary items, 
which is not apparent in other mentally challenged groups (Reilly et al., 1990; Volterra et al., 
1996). Here is what a person with WS (age 32) replied when asked what he would want other 
people to know about WS. 
 
“We are respectable, loving, understanding people. With pride, and dignity, 
and grace. And people should understand that Williams Syndrome people 
don’t really care about the bad things in life and what goes on in the world 
because we as people have enough of problems of our own, living day to 
day… First of all I am a human being, and I am a man, and I am an older 
adult. And I want people to realize that I do have feelings, I’m not a freak… 
So, respectability is a main factor in learning how to deal with people with 
Williams Syndrome or any other syndrome.”     
  
 (Bellugi et al., 2001, xiv) 
 
This individual with WS evidently has quite large and varied vocabulary. Researchers often 
describe people with WS as eloquent and verbose. However, do they understand everything 
they say? Is everything they say semantically structured and processed in the same way as for 
people classified as TD? Many investigations claimed that although WS individuals show 
remarkable vocabulary skills in adolescence and adulthood, their lexical semantics are not 
without anomalies. The experimental works of Bellugi et al. (1988) and Rossen et al. (1996) 
showed that the choice of words WS people use is often unusual, particularly because they 
tend to use more low-frequency words. They also reported that word-definition and speeded 
naming tasks reveal certain lexico-semantic deficits in WS language. Another work that 
presented evidence for aberrant semantic processing in WS is the work by Neville and 
collaborators (Neville, Mills, & Bellugi, 1994; Neville, Holcomb, & Mills, 1989). They 
measured neuropsychological correlates to semantic processing by using Event Related 
Potentials (ERPs) and found different temporal patterns in the brain activity of WS subjects 
in contrast to TD controls. However, despite the claims that semantic processing in WS is 
abnormal, Tyler et al. (1997) argued that the semantic organization of WS lexicon is normal. 
They conducted a study in which they measured semantic priming effects in word-word 
associations and found no significant difference between the results of WS subjects and TD 
40 
 
controls. In this chapter, I will first look into all these findings and then discuss how they 
might be related to the debate about cognitive dissociations.  
 
 
6.1 Off-line experiments of WS language comprehension 
6.1.1 Word-definition  
 
The first clue that the WS lexical semantic processing is aberrant comes from 
experiments using a word-definition task. The word-definition task investigates the ability of 
a subject to explain the meaning of a given word. The responses in this task are scored for 
accuracy and completeness. The highest scores are received if the subject provides a precise 
definition in which the most salient features of the word are included, while the responses 
that include the superordinate categories or some descriptive characteristics of the word are 
scored lower.  
Bellugi et al. (1988) tested the comprehension of three adolescents with WS (Van - 
age 11, IQ 50; Cristal – age 15, IQ 49; Ben – age 16, IQ 54) on the Oral Vocabulary subtest 
of the Test of Language Development in which the subject are required to give oral 
definitions for 20 common English words. Here are their responses when asked what the 
word sad means.  
 
Van:  “Sad is when someone dies; someone is hurt, like when you cry.”  
Crystal: “Sad means that someone hurts your feelings, or when someone starts 
crying.”  
Ben:  “When you lost somebody that you love and care about. It means 
something happens to you like your grandmother died or some part of 
your family or your cousin.” 
 
       (Bellugi et al., 1988, p. 197)  
 
It is evident that their definitions tend to be lengthy and descriptive, but they lack the most 
salient feature of the word sad. The precise definition of the word sad should include ‘it is a 
(type of) feeling’. Here is another definition that illustrates only a very distant association to 
the target word in the form of a rather loose description.  
 
Experimenter: “What does poor mean?” 
Crystal:   “Means they are hungry; they are dying from exposure.”  
 
        (Bellugi et al., 1988, p. 197) 
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Generally, WS individuals score very low on word-definition tasks. However, Bellugi et al. 
(1988) reported that in a spontaneous speech WS individuals are able to use all the words 
from the test correctly. Bellugi et al. (1992) emphasized that word-definition tasks include 
metalinguistic demands that WS people are unable to fulfill. We will see in section 6.2.2 that 
a similar observation was made by Tyler et al. (1997).  
 
6.1.2 Speeded naming and spontaneous speech 
  
The second clue to possible aberrant semantic processing in WS comes from the 
speeded naming tasks. In speeded naming tasks, the subject needs to provide as many words 
as possible on a requested topic within a limited period of time. The speed at which names of 
items can be accessed provides information about the semantic abilities of the subject. 
Furthermore, this task can also provide the insight of how the mental lexicon of the subject is 
organized.  
Bellugi et al. (1988) administered the Clinical Evaluation of Language Functions - 
Producing Word Associations test. In separate trials, the subjects were asked to name as 
many animal names as they could within 60 seconds. The results were evaluated 
quantitatively (i.e., by observing a total number of different words produced) and 
qualitatively (i.e., by investigating the number of subcategories within each semantic 
category and the number of shifts between them). The following are examples of the 
responses from the WS subjects for animal names: 
 
Van:  Sea lion, zebra, hippopotamus, lizard, beaver, kangaroo, chihuahua, 
crocodile, tiger, owl, turtle, reptile, frog, giraffe  
Crystal: Koala bear, antelope, moose, anteater, lion, tiger, rat, bear, giraffe, 
elephant  
Ben:  Buffalo, leopard, sabretooth tiger, condor, vulture, turtle, bear, snake, 
giraffe, lion, bull, dog, cat, tiger 
      (Bellugi et al., 1988, p. 198)  
 
It is noticeable that the subjects did not have difficulties accessing numerous members of a 
given semantic category. Thus, quantitatively WS subjects do not present any semantic 
deficits. However, qualitatively their semantic organization appears to be unusual. Bellugi et 
al. (1988) noted that their responses were surprising because they did not only provide 
general subclasses of items but also very specific, rare and nonprototypical animals. Similar 
tendency to use unusual words was observed in their spontaneous speech. For example: 
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“The bees abort the beehive”, meaning: “The bees leave the beehive”  
(Rossen et al., 1996, p. 384) 
“I’ll put the earrings and you can buckle them”, meaning: “…you can fasten 
them”         
(Bellugi et al. 1994, p. 32) 
 
Rossen et al. (1996) interpreted these unusual word choices of WS individuals as a clue for 
lexico-semantic anomalies. Contrary to this interpretation, Semel and Rosner, (2003) argued 
that such choices might be slightly off the mark semantically, but again not inappropriate in 
terms of context.  
 
6.1.3 Homonyms  
 
A third indication that WS semantic processing is atypical emerges from the 
responses of WS individuals to tasks that include homonyms. Homonyms are words that are 
spelled or pronounced the same but have different meanings. Each homonym (e.g., bank) has 
at least two meanings: one more frequently used, primary meaning (associated with money) 
and the other less frequently used, secondary meaning (associated with river). In a situation 
where the meaning of a homonym is not contextualized most people tend to interpret it by 
choosing its primary meaning. 
Rossen et al. (1996) used three different tasks to assess the WS comprehension of 
homonyms: free association, similarity judgment, and definitions. In the free association task, 
the homonym was read to the subjects, and then they were asked to say the first word that 
comes to their mind. In the similarity judgment task, the subjects were given a word triad 
(e.g., BANK-RIVER-MONEY) and then they were asked to “pick two that go best together”. 
In the definition task, the subjects were simply asked to say everything they know about the 
meaning of the target homonym. The results showed that WS subjects performed much like 
the TD controls in the free association task. They associated the target homonym with its 
primary meaning more frequently. By contrast, in the other two tasks, WS subjects were 
using the secondary meaning more often than the TD controls. While TD controls 
demonstrated a clear preference for primary meanings, WS subjects chose randomly between 
primary and secondary meanings. Rossen et al. (1996) concluded that individuals with WS 
are less sensitive to word frequency than TD individuals, which again implies that their 
semantic processing is aberrant. He further suggested that this aberrant semantic processing is 
probably caused by an abnormal lexical organization.  
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6.2 On-line experiments of WS language comprehension 
6.2.1 Event-Related Potentials  
 
 The first experimental study which directly measured brain activity during the 
semantic processing of WS individuals was conducted by Neville and collaborators (Neville, 
Mills, & Bellugi, 1994; Neville, Holcomb, & Mills, 1989). They investigated the processing 
of semantic information in sentences (in people with WS) by looking at Event-Related 
Potentials (ERPs). This study differed greatly from the previously-reviewed behavioral (off-
line) investigations because it directly measures real-time language processing by recording 
changes in the temporal patterns of brain activity. Before I present this investigation, I will 
briefly introduce some basic facts about the nature of this kind of research. 
 Human brains store enormous amounts of various kinds of information about the 
world. In the normal brain, these different pieces of information are rapidly retrieved from the 
‘semantic memory’ as a reaction to a linguistic signal, such as a spoken, written or signed 
word. What is fascinating is the fact that the brain of a TD language user is able to perform 
this action in only hundreds of milliseconds. This is approximately the amount of time the 
brain needs to make sense of a word heard in an ongoing discourse (Kutas & Federmeier, 
2000). When we observe the linguistic behavior of TD people, retrieving information from 
the semantic memory seems to be an effortless process. However, if we look at semantic 
processing from the brain perspective, we realize that it is actually achieved by complex 
neural mechanisms.  
Uncovering the underlying brain mechanisms that enable semantic processing is 
essential for a better understanding of human cognition, and thus for language faculty itself. 
Off-line studies, like the ones mentioned above, analyze different language behaviors of 
people and then evaluate whether the semantic information is processed normally or not 
during language comprehension. However, such studies cannot explain how the brain 
constructs meaning and how this meaning is retrieved during language comprehension. Also, 
they cannot explain how fast the process of retrieving semantic information is, which is again 
an important fact in evaluating whether the process itself is abnormal or not.  
Neuroimaging techniques can provide us with the information on brain activity during 
semantic processing. Hemodynamic-based neuroimaging methods, such as Functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) imaging, 
provide excellent spatial resolution. Hence, they can show the location of a brain activity 
during semantic processing with certain precision. However, their temporal resolution is 
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limited because they cannot capture events occurring faster than a second or two. Since the 
semantic processing, like any other brain processing, is happening within milliseconds, fMRI 
and PET imaging are not capable of capturing it. Electroencephalography (EEG), however, 
provides a very high temporal resolution which can capture events occurring within 
milliseconds (cf. Dale & Sereno, 1993; Kutas & Dale, 1997). Therefore, EEG studies can 
illustrate the temporal changes during the brain processing (in this case semantic processing), 
and they do so in the form of event-related potentials (ERPs). ERP is the recorded measure of 
brain response to some sensory, cognitive or motor event. (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000).  
In 1980, Kutas and Hillyard used the EEG method to look at semantic processing of 
TD individuals. They monitored the electrophysiological response to a semantically 
anomalous word (e.g., pencil) in a sentence context (e.g., He shaved off his mustache and 
pencil). The participants in the experiment were requested to silently read 160 seven-word 
sentences presented one word at a time. A random 25% of those 160 sentences ended in a 
semantically inappropriate, but syntactically correct word. They discovered that the 
unexpected sentence ending elicits a negative-going brain wave that peaks around 400 msec 
(N400). The N400 is an electrophysiological brain component of “time-locked EEG signals” 
referred to as ERPs (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000). In the same study, Kutas and Hillyard 
(1980) found out that the N400 was not caused by any type of violation at the end of a 
sentence. For instance, a semantically expected but physically unexpected word (because in 
capital letters) at the end of a sentence (e.g., He shaved off his mustache and BEARD) 
elicited a positive-going brain wave that peaks around 300 msec (P300). Moreover, more 
recent investigations showed that a syntactic violation (e.g., He shaved off his mustache and 
swimming) elicits a positive component P600 (see Coulson, King, & Kutas, 1998). These 
different findings indicate that the N400 is particularly related to semantic processing, and is 
not simply a response to any unexpected stimulus. Hence, neurolinguists suggest that the 
N400 provides a window into our knowledge of the semantics of words. 
Now that we have an idea of what ERP studies are and how they are used to measure 
brain activity, let us return to the investigations by Neville and collaborators (Neville, Mills, 
& Bellugi, 1994; Neville, Holcomb, & Mills, 1989). Neville, Mills, and Bellugi (1994) 
replicated and modified the Kutas and Hillyard’s (1980) experiment. They observed two 
small groups of subjects with WS: one group of 4 children (10-14 year olds) and one group of 
4 adults (18-20 year olds). Their ERPs were compared to the ERPs of TD subjects (5-22 year 
olds). The participants were requested to read or listened to sentences presented one word at a 
time at their own pace that ended in either a highly semantically probable way (e.g., I have 
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five fingers on my hand) or an anomalous way (e.g., I have five fingers on my water). In 
contrast to Kutas and Hillyard (1980), Neville, Mills, and Bellugi (1994) tested brain 
reactions on both visual and auditory stimuli (see the figures below). In the visual modality, 
the TD subjects showed a gradual decrease of the amplitude of N400 to unexpected words 
and a loss of N400 to expected words with increasing age. The WS subjects displayed similar 
responses to visual stimuli. However, the pattern of the ERPs to auditory stimuli in WS 
individuals was different from the one found in TD controls. In TD subjects, the unexpected 
auditory word at the end of a sentence elicited a large negativity response (N400) and a loss 
of N400 to expected words by 15 years, when ERPs are characterized by a late positive 
component (LPC). WS subjects displayed unusually enhanced positivity to expected sentence 
endings than TD subjects of corresponding ages. For auditory stimulus, results from WS 
subjects showed a difference in timing of the activation of the brain response, as well as, the 
difference in the distribution of reactions across the brain regions, relative to TD controls. In 
TD controls, the N400 effect was larger from the right than from the left hemisphere for both 
auditory and visual stimulus exposure, and this asymmetry was increased with age. The WS 
subjects did not show this pattern of asymmetry in the auditory modality. In WS subjects, the 
N400 effect was larger over the left hemisphere. (Neville, Mills, & Bellugi 1994).  
We can see that ERPs can reveal both the timing and location of semantic processing 
during language comprehension. The results of Neville, Mills, and Bellugi’s (1994) study 
show that both the timing and the location of semantic processing in WS population display 
certain abnormalities. Moreover, other researchers who used ERPs for the investigation of 
WS language comprehension have presented comparable findings to the ones I reviewed here 
(e.g., see George, Milles, & Bellugi, 2000; Mills et al., 2003; Fisherman et al., 2010). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the findings from the on-line studies based on ERPs are in 
line with the hypothesis made based on the off-line studies mentioned in previous sections. 
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     (Taken from Neville, Mills, & Bellugi, 1994, p. 93-94) 
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    (Taken from Neville, Mills, & Bellugi, 1994, p. 90-91) 
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6.2.2 Semantic priming  
 
 All hitherto mentioned studies point to an abnormality in the semantic processing of 
the WS population. Rossen et al. (1996) argued that the malfunction in WS semantic 
processing is probably caused by an abnormal lexical organization. Tyler et al. (1997) 
conducted an on-line study to investigate whether such argument can be confirmed by 
looking at the directly measured effects of semantic priming.  
 Semantic priming refers to an occurrence when the recognition of a word is speeded 
by the prior presentation of a semantically related word. This event is assumed to be driven 
by the semantic overlap between prime and target word. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that when a person is presented with the word cat (prime word) before being 
exposed to a word dog (target word), he/she needs less time to recognize that the word dog is 
an actual English word because the two words are semantically related. In other words, the 
meanings of these two words are referencing each other in some way. However, if the prime 
word (e.g., cat) is semantically unrelated to the target word (e.g., vase) a person needs more 
time to recognize the target word (cf. Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Hence, priming can 
influence word recognition in two different ways. It can speed up target word processing 
which is called facilitation, or it can slow it down which is referred to as inhibition (Gulan & 
Valerjev, 2010). 
How can such an occurrence be explained? I mentioned in the previous section that 
human brain is retrieving lexical information very rapidly. As an explanation for this, 
linguists assume that all the different lexical information that we are storing in our brains are 
semantically organized. This further suggests that that the retrieval of semantically related 
words in succession should be faster than the retrieval of semantically unrelated words. Of 
course, faster triggering of a word recognition can be provoked by many other connections as 
well. For instance, words that sound similar but don’t have any semantic relation to each 
other (e.g. cheese and please) can trigger faster recognition of one another by phonetic 
association. This is called phonetic priming. Possibilities for priming word recognition are 
numerous, however, for the sake of the Tyler et al.’s (1997) experiment, I will stay within the 
frame of semantic priming.   
Semantic priming is considered to be a very reliable method for investigating 
semantic organization in the mental lexicon because it illustrates automatic activation of 
semantic information. This is the reason Tyler et al. chose this method for their experiment. 
Their aim was to avoid placing any extra cognitive demands on WS subjects. As they 
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explained, most of the studies that investigated language comprehension of WS individuals 
used explicit tasks, where subjects have to access semantic information in a controlled, 
explicit manner. Such explicit tasks include sorting, matching, abstract thinking, etc. All 
these things require cognitive involvement that goes beyond “purely linguistic knowledge” 
(cf. Bellugi et al., 1992; Tyler et al., 1992; for further discussion see chapter 7). In contrast, 
the task that Tyler et al. (1997) used examined semantic knowledge implicitly. The subjects 
were not required to explicitly retrieve the meanings of the words they heard, i.e., no overt 
responses were requested from them. According to Tyler et al. (1997) implicit tasks, such as 
semantic priming, can “reveal sparing of semantic knowledge which, on the basis of explicit 
tasks, is assumed to be inaccessible or lost” (p. 518).   
The semantic priming experiment that Tyler et al. (1997) conducted included 12 WS 
subjects aged 14;1–30;5. Their IQs ranged from 45-87, and their vocabulary MA ranged from 
7;1–16;4. Their results were compared to 20 TD subjects who were slightly older in CA, 
ranging in age 18-40 years. The study examined two aspects of semantic organization: 
category structure and functional attributes. Category structure examines whether WS lexicon 
has an organized structure of taxonomically related words (e.g., desk-chair), whereas 
functional attributes examine whether WS individuals associate different thematically related 
concepts (e.g., baby-crib) in the same way as TD individuals (cf. section 5.2.2).  
The participants were tested using a primed monitoring task, in which they were 
requested to press a reaction time button as soon as they heard a target word which was pre-
specified by the examiner. Each hearing trial involved listening to a list of words played with 
a constant interval between each spoken word. The lists of words were short, varying from 5-
10 words. The target word was always the last word on the list. In one version of the 
experiment the target word (e.g., umbrella) was immediately preceded by the related prime 
word (e.g., rain), while in the other version it was immediately preceded by the unrelated 
control word (e.g., essay). The rest of the words on the lists (filler words) preceding the 
prime-target pair were all semantically unrelated to the prime-target pair. Also, none of them 
started or ended with the same phonological sequences as the target word so that 
phonological priming could be avoided (see an example of these lists below).  
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       (Taken from Tyler et al., 1997, p. 521) 
 
Before each hearing trial, the participants were told the target word they were 
supposed to monitor for. In order to measure the time participants need to recognize a target 
word, a timing pulse was set at the onset of each target word, and it was stopped when the 
subject pressed the response button. If the participant’s reaction times to detect target words 
were faster when they were preceded by the related prime word than when preceded by the 
unrelated control word, then the priming effect is displayed.  
Tyler et al. (1997) reported that the reaction times of WS subjects for semantically 
related pairs were only slightly slower than the ones of TD controls, which was statistically 
insignificant. Similar to those the of TD controls, the monitoring latencies of the WS subjects 
were significantly faster in the semantically related condition than in the semantically 
unrelated condition. Moreover, both taxonomically and thematically related word-pairs 
primed strongly in WS individuals (see the table below). This indicates that WS individuals 
are able to retrieve various kinds of semantic information rapidly when they hear a word, and 
then to use this information to facilitate subsequent words which are related in different ways. 
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Finally, contrary to Rossen et al.’s (1996) proposal, Tyler et al. (1997) found no evidence that 
the lexical organization of WS individuals is impaired. 
 
 
       
       (Taken from Tyler et al., 1997, p. 523) 
 
 
6.3 Summary 
 
 Around the age of two, individuals with WS start to produce their first words. In time, 
their vocabulary increases and already in adolescence their vocabulary knowledge is reported 
to be much better than one could predict judging by the level of their IQs. This was not found 
in any other intellectually challenged population. In everyday speech, WS adults display 
surprisingly varied and erudite-sounding vocabulary. However, researchers are still 
questioning whether they understand all the words they use. Findings from several 
investigations suggested that the semantic processing of WS people is abnormal (Bellugi et 
al., 1988; Bellugi et al., 1994; Rossen et al., 1996). In three of these investigations, 
researchers used off-line experiments to probe the vocabulary comprehension of WS 
individuals. The first experiment tested their ability to give oral definitions of 20 common 
English words. The second experiment investigated their semantic organization via the 
speeded naming task. And the third experiment explored their comprehension of homonyms. 
Off-line experiments showed that individuals with WS have difficulties in precisely defining 
very common words, although they are able to correctly use them in their spontaneous 
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speech. They also demonstrated that WS people are capable of naming numerous words that 
belong to the same category in limited time. However, these numerous words that belong to 
the same category are often unusually organized in a sense that various basic subordinates are 
mixed with rare and nonprototypical category members. Moreover, the off-line experiments 
also showed that WS individuals are prone to insert some low-frequency words in their 
sentences which sometimes might seem semantically inappropriate. Their insensitivity to 
word frequency was also displayed in the experiment where the comprehension of homonyms 
was tested. Besides these clues that come from various off-line experiments, findings that 
indicate malfunctioning of WS semantic processing came from one on-line study as well 
(Neville et al., 1994). This on-line study directly observed WS brain responses to 
semantically inappropriate sentence endings by using ERPs. This method enabled the 
researchers to find out how WS brain reacts to semantic anomalies in contrasts to normal 
brain. The data from this on-line experiment showed that both the timing and the nature of 
real-time semantic processing in WS brain are to some degree different from the ones found 
in the normal brain. Finally, despite all the evidence that imply that semantic processing is 
not without anomalies, researchers that employed semantic priming task claim that semantic 
organization of WS individuals is not impaired (Tyler et al., 1997). They found no significant 
difference between WS and TD individuals in time they need to automatically access the 
semantic information.  
How can we explain the discrepancies in the findings of these various studies on WS 
language comprehension? Is it possible that WS individuals possess unimpaired semantic 
memory and yet abnormal semantic processing? First, we must say that the hypothesis made 
based on the observations of explicit language behaviors should always be taken with 
caution. In other words, data found in the off-line studies mentioned above are not really 
reliable sources when it comes to deciding how the different brain processes in WS are 
functioning. However, if we look at the results of the two on-line studies presented above 
they might seem conflicting. Both of these studies aimed to examine automatic processes 
which are involved in language comprehension. Nevertheless, each had a different focus. 
Neville et al. (1994) focused on examining the WS automatic activation of brain responses on 
semantically appropriate versus inappropriate sentence endings, which involved the 
processing of words in a sentence. Tyler et al. (1997), on the other hand, focused on testing 
the WS semantic organization of the mental lexicon, which involved automatic activation of 
individual word meanings. Thus, Neville et al. (1994) observed the processing of words in 
sentential contexts, whereas Tyler et al. (1997) observed the processing of words in isolation. 
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Taking into consideration findings of both studies, we can assume that the semantic memory 
of WS people is structured normally since they do not show any difficulties in accessing 
individual word meanings. However, when WS people start to integrate word meanings into 
sentential contexts, problems with the semantic processing arise. Such interpretation could 
also explain why they have far better scores on vocabulary comprehension tests that involve 
simple word to picture matching than on the ones that involve giving word explanations. In 
the former, they only need to access individual word meanings while in the latter they need to 
integrate different pieces of semantic information into sentential context. In the following 
chapter, I will discuss what the nature of the WS’s unusual lexico-semantic processing might 
be. That is, whether the impairments in different parts of the cognition in WS individuals 
maybe interfere with their knowledge of language.  
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7 Language and other cognitive abilities – 
 cross domain interactions  
  
If the semantic organization of WS mental lexicon is functionally equivalent to the 
one of TD, why is the semantic processing of WS different from the one in TD? Tyler et al. 
(1997) argued that most of the tasks used for investigation of WS language comprehension 
involved more cognitive demands than WS individuals can keep track of due to their general 
mental disability. Their aim was to avoid this. If they succeeded to employ the task that 
examines “purely linguistic knowledge”, we might assume that WS language comprehension 
shows anomalies whenever lexico-semantic processing requires interaction with other 
cognitive domains.  
The first indication that WS lexico-semantic processing shows abnormalities when 
language interacts with other cognitive domains emerges from word-definition tasks. If we 
assume that a word-definition task involves the ability of the subject to make transformations 
in the properties of concepts, then we can say that such task (apart from involving the 
activation of appropriate lexico-semantic information) involves the non-linguistic ability of 
problem-solving. If this is so, it shouldn’t be a surprise that WS adolescents and adults 
perform poorly in word-definition tasks since most of them also have difficulties solving 
simple transformational tasks from Piagetian number or mass conservation problems (Bellugi 
et al., 1988).  
The second indication comes from the spontaneous speech of WS individuals. The 
retrieval of the appropriate semantic information and the integration of that information into 
sentential context might involve planning and sorting of the relevant words (semantic 
information) from the mental lexicon before their integration in context. Planning and sorting 
are again cognitive skills that are impaired in WS people (see Bellugi et al. 1988, 1994). Thus 
it is possible that the effect of this impairment is reflected in WS language.  
Finally, third and maybe the strongest indication that WS individuals’ lexico-semantic 
processing breaks down when other cognitive domains need to be included is their 
comprehension and usage of semantic relational terms. WS people show severe impairments 
in visuo-spatial intelligence (see Atkinson et al., 2001; Farran & Jarrold, 2003). Accordingly, 
it has been found that they also have difficulties comprehending and using directional (e.g., 
right, left, up, down), special (e.g., in, on, above, below), and positional (e.g., top, bottom, 
high, low) terms (Semel & Rosner, 2003). Bellugi et al. (2000) reported that WS subjects (10-
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41 year-olds) make far more errors than their MA matches on the test specifically designed to 
probe their knowledge of spatial prepositions. In picture matching part of that test, WS 
subjects selected wrong picture referent for spatial prepositions (such as in front of, between, 
above) 11,5% of the time, while their TD controls made such errors only 0,2% of the time. In 
the part of the test where subjects are required to describe a picture containing spatial 
relations between two objects, WS individuals performed even worse (see below the 
examples of the errors they made; figure 1.14). They produced erroneous picture descriptions 
30% of the time, as opposed to their TD controls who had a significantly lower error rate.   
 
 
      (Taken from Bellugi et al., 2000, p. 23) 
 
After this initial investigation by Bellugi et al. (2000), many researchers started to examine 
the interaction between WS visuo-spatial cognition and WS language (e.g., Landau & 
Zukowski 2003; Phillips et al., 2004; Landau & Hoffman, 2005; Lakusta, Wagner, & Landau, 
2007; Lukacs, Pleh, & Racsmany, 2007). In the following sections, I will present Phillips et 
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al. (2004) investigations and then discuss how their findings might be interpreted when it 
comes to the hypothesis that WS is evidence for a dissociation between language and other 
cognitive skills. 
 
 
7.1 Spatial language and spatial cognition 
 
Similarly to Bellugi et al.’s (2000) investigation, Phillips et al. (2004) administered 
two studies to examine the interaction between language and visuo-spatial cognition in WS 
by testing individuals' comprehension of spoken language with a spatial component.  
In the first study, they employed Test for Reception of Grammar (Bishop, 1983). The 
TROG is a standardized measure designed to test grammatical comprehension. It consists of 
20 different tasks (blocks from A-T) each of which probes different grammatical 
constructions. In each task, the participant is presented with four pictures and is asked to 
point to the one that best corresponds to a spoken word, phrase, or sentence. The TROG is 
usually used for the assessment of verbal MA of WS individuals so that they could be 
matched and compared with the control groups in different experiments. When researchers 
use the TROG for these purposes, they simply assess the overall performances of subjects 
and convert them to the verbal MA values. Phillips et al. (2004) used the TROG for different 
purposes. They aimed to directly examine the possibility that spatial items within the TROG 
might be actually affecting WS individuals’ overall performance on this test.  
Phillips et al. (2004)  estimated that there are three blocks within the TROG that could 
be considered to contain a spatial component. These three blocks are:  
 
 (1) Block K, which tests the understanding of longer, bigger, taller than;  
(e.g., The toothbrush is longer than the pencil.) 
 
(2) Block M, which tests the understanding of prepositions in and on;  
(e.g., The apple is in the basket.) 
 
(3) Block P, which assesses understanding of prepositions above and below.  
(e.g., The bird is below the flower.) 
       (Adapted from Phillips et al., 2004)   
 
The prediction of the study was that if individuals with WS have difficulties with the 
comprehension of spatial terms, as a result of their spatial cognitive impairments, then they 
ought to find these three blocks of the TROG especially difficult. 
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The first study tested the performance of 32 individuals with WS (8-38 year olds) and 
compared it to the performance of two control groups; a group of 32 children with moderate 
learning difficulties (MLD), and a group of 32 TD children. Both control groups were 
matched on verbal MA with WS subjects. The results showed that  the subjects with WS 
indeed have particular difficulty in comprehending the sentences from the blocks; K, M, and 
P of the TROG. They made significantly more errors on these blocks (that contain spatial 
component) than both the TD and the MLD controls, who actually find these blocks quite 
easy. Contrary to this, the performance of WS subjects on other blocks (the ones that do not 
contain spatial component) was in line with the ones of TD and MLD controls. Thus, the 
findings confirm that individuals with WS, who have severe impairments on visuo-spatial 
cognitive tasks, also have difficulties with understanding the language that contains spatial 
components.  
Since the TROG was not originally designed for an assessment of comprehension of 
spatial and non-spatial terms, and since it only has 3 blocks with a spatial aspect, Phillips et 
al. (2004) created a test that could specifically be used for these purposes. This test was 
named ‘Test For Receptive Understanding of Spatial Terms’ (TRUST). It was loosely based 
on the TROG, but it included more items with a spatial component. So besides the spatial 
terms that are used in the TROG (in, on, above, below and longer/bigger), the TRUST also 
assessed the comprehension of the terms behind (e.g., The apple is behind the cup), in front 
of (e.g., The dog is in front of the house) and shorter/smaller (e.g., The snowman is shorter 
than the penguin). For the sake of the comparison, the TRUST incorporated four tasks from 
the TROG that do not include spatial terms or constructions. These are:  
 
(1) Block L, which tests the understanding of reversible passives;  
 (e.g., The rabbit is pushed by the snail.) 
 
(2) Block O, which tests the understanding of X but not Y;  
 (e.g., The pig is muddy but not pink.) 
 
(3) Block Q, which tests the understanding of not only X but also Y; 
 (e.g., Not only the hat but also the boot is gray) 
 
(4) Block S, which tests the understanding of neither X nor Y. 
 (e.g., The strawberry is neither blue nor red.)  
 
      (Adapted from Phillips et al., 2004)   
Apart from these four blocks from the TROG, the TRUST also included one novel task that 
does not include spatial component and that is the comprehension of the comparatives 
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‘darker than/lighter than’. This task was included as a direct comparison for the spatial 
comparatives (e.g., longer than/shorter than). 
 This second study included 15 WS individuals whose performance was compared to 
two control groups matched on vocabulary MA. The TRUST was presented in practically the 
same way as the TROG, except that the pictures were presented on a computer screen. The 
results from this second study supported the results from the first study. They confirmed that, 
relative to the TD controls, the WS subjects seemed to have specific difficulties in 
comprehending spoken descriptions of spatial relationships. The results also showed that, 
compared to the controls, the WS subjects made significantly fewer errors on non-spatial as 
opposed to spatial terms. In fact, the WS subjects performed comparably to the TD matches 
on the non-spatial terms. This indicates that WS subjects’ comprehension of non-spatial 
terms was is in line with their level of receptive vocabulary.  
Phillips et al. (2004) made an interesting observation in this second study. They 
noticed that when WS individuals fail to select the correct picture in this task with a spatial 
component, they tend to choose the picture that depicts the exact opposite of the target spatial 
term. For example, for the spoken description The dog is behind the house they tend to 
choose the picture that depicts the dog that is standing in front of the house. If we take a 
closer look at the above sample errors of WS subjects from Bellugi et al. (2000) study, we 
can notice the same occurance. Phillips et al. (2004) called this type of error a systematic 
error. According to them, systematic errors suggest that WS individuals do not have any 
particular difficulty in comprehending the broad sense of what terms, such as behind and in 
front of  refer to, rather they have difficulties  “either in discriminating these terms from one 
another, or in representing the ordering of the relation between the two objects” (Phillips et 
al., 2004, p. 24).  
 All in all, finding from both studies by Phillips et al. (2004) provide strong evidence 
that people with WS experience a specific problem in understanding of language that 
includes a spatial component.  
 
 
7.2 Dissociation of language and other cognitive skills? 
 
Since the earliest studies on WS, researchers have emphasized that people with WS 
show an imbalance in their cognitive profile. Various studies have found that the language 
skills of WS individuals are superior to the rest of their cognition (see chapter 4). Such 
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findings have led to the hypothesis that WS is evidence that verbal and non-verbal cognitive 
domains develop independently (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1994, 1996; Flavell et al., 1993; Levy, 
1996; Pinker 1994). However, the more detailed studies of WS revealed many inconsistencies 
within the language domain itself and, as we saw in the previous two sections, some of these 
inconsistencies seem to be influenced by the non-verbal cognition. This might point to the 
fact that verbal and non-verbal domains do not function independently, but are rather 
involved in a complex process of interactions. Several authors have suggested that the 
language strengths of WS people might help them facilitate their non-linguistic performance 
(e.g., Bellugi et al., 1988, have argued that people with WS often talk their way through 
drawing tasks, as if they are using their verbal strengths to mediate visuo-spatial 
performance), while only few have considered whether non-verbal deficits of WS people 
actually impinge on their language performance. 
The findings from Phillips et al. (2004) studies presented in the previous section 
provide a clue that WS people’s difficulties in spatial awareness can constrain certain aspects 
of their language performance (for similar findings see also Landau & Zukowski 2003; 
Landau & Hoffman, 2005; Lakusta, Wagner, & Landau, 2007). This could be evidence that 
language and non-language domains are not necessarily separate from one another, as has 
typically been suggested. If this is so, the new question arises. In what way do spatial 
cognition and language interact in WS? Phillips et al. (2004) suggested two possible answers 
to this question. The first answer is that this “interaction is a reflection of conceptual 
difficulties in the comprehension of space rather than in any fundamentally linguistic 
difficulty with spatial language per se” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 28). In other words, it should 
not be surprising that WS individuals have problems comprehending language with a spatial 
component when they have little knowledge of space. For instance, even a person with an 
excellent level of language abilities might have difficulties in making sense of language that 
incorporates terms from an subject area that he/she knows little about, e.g., quantum physics. 
The second answer is that ”it may be that spatial difficulties in Williams syndrome interact in 
a more fundamental way with the ‘on-line’ comprehension of spoken descriptions of space” 
(Phillips et al., 2004, p. 28). That is, it is possible that general mental disability of individuals 
with WS limits their ability to construct spatial ‘mental models’ so that they could be able to 
understand the verbal descriptions of space. Thus, in contrast to the first interpretation, the 
second interpretation suggests that, even with an extensive teaching of what space is, WS 
people might not be able to fully grasp the notion of space because their mental abilities are 
constraining them, which in turn constrains their ability to understand spatial language.  
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The debate whether the verbal and non-verbal cognition of WS people interact or 
function separately clearly needs further investigations. The new investigations should 
include tests with language terms that have components from other impaired areas of WS 
cognition. For example, language terms or phrases that involve numbers or time, because 
these are also areas in which WS people show severe impairments (Bellugi et al., 1988; 
Paterson, 2000). However, taking into consideration that language is multifaceted, proving 
that WS lexico-semantic processing is abnormal because it is dependent on non-verbal 
cognitive domains still does not prove that all aspects of WS language interact with non-
verbal cognitive domains. As we have seen earlier in this paper, some researchers proposed 
that the knowledge of grammar is intact in WS individuals (Clahsen & Almazan, 1998).   
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8. Is Williams Syndrom language a window into normal 
language development? 
 
 
 We have seen in chapter four that the studies which reported a significant advantage 
of WS language skills over their non-verbal skills were mostly conducted on WS adolescence 
and adults. These findings led researchers of nativist persuasion to claim that WS is evidence 
for the existence of language module. However, more recent studies, which employed the 
neurochostructivist approach to language acquisition, challenged this claim. These studies 
tested much younger children with WS and always aimed to include a larger number of WS 
participants who were then strictly matched on verbal MA to controls (cf. chapter 4). The 
results from these studies that followed developmental trajectories indicate that it is wrong to 
make conclusions about the initial state of the brain only by looking at its end state. As 
neuroconstructivists noted, the straightforward application of modularity theory to apparent 
strengths of WS adult brain evades the fact that the initial state of WS brain might be 
different from its adult state (cf. section 3.1.1). The data from studies conducted on infants 
and younger children with WS confirm this theory (cf. chapter 5). They demonstrate that WS 
language is delayed, but they do not report that it is better than it might be predicted 
considering their IQ levels. As Rossen et al. (1996) noted, the first significant advantages in 
WS vocabulary are not evident before the early adolescence. Moreover, the more detailed 
experimental studies of WS semantics suggest that even when WS individuals begin to show 
verbal advantages this still does not prove that their language skills are without anomalies (cf. 
chapters 6 and 7). 
Since my analysis of the various language studies on WS individuals strongly 
indicates that WS language is neither intact nor does it follow typical development, my 
opinion is that it seems inappropriate to draw conclusions about typical language 
development based on WS language development.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
By analyzing various studies on WS language, I found out several important facts 
about WS language. First, in contrast to TD children, the language development of WS 
children is delayed. This delay might occur due to their lack of typical pre-linguistic 
behaviors. Second, even after this delayed onset, WS children do not seem to follow the same 
language development. Some researchers suppose that the insensitivity of WS individuals to 
the lexical constraints indicate that they rely more on phonetics than on semantics when they 
learn new words. Third, I found out that, even though WS adults are very fluent speakers, 
they might not always understand everything they say. Several experiments indicate that 
there might be some abnormalities in their semantic processing. These abnormalities are 
usually shown on tests that are assumed to be more cognitively demanding. If this is true, we 
cannot say that language is entirely separate from the rest of the cognition. This further 
suggests that it is wrong to claim that WS is evidence for dissociation between language and 
other cognitive skills.  
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10. Suggestions for further research 
 
Language acquisition has always puzzled linguists. Many theories have been 
proposed, however, the nature-nurture debate has always remained. With the development of 
neuroconstructivism, this debate might finally be resolved. Nevertheless, neuroconstructivism 
indeed offers a new perspective on how we should observe language development, 
particularly the language development of people with cognitive impairments. We are 
witnessing that the new technological developments are shifting the focus of theoretical 
approaches to language acquisition from an observation of language behavior to a direct 
inspection of brain reactions to linguistic stimuli. This should not come as a surprise since the 
brain is a source of all our behaviors and experiences. In this thesis, I looked at the study 
which used ERPs to test the timing and location of brain responses to a word stimulus. Using 
such methods seems to be very useful, particularly in language investigations of people with 
a mental disorder like WS. My thesis examined ERP studies only in regards to WS semantics, 
however, it would be very interesting to find out whether the same or similar techniques have 
been used to test WS phonetics, especially because it has been proposed that individuals with 
WS might be relying more on phonetics than on semantics when they learn new words. 
Furthermore, since my thesis has mainly been focused on WS semantics, further research 
should encompass other aspects of WS language, such as syntax and morphology. Several 
studies I looked at suggested that even though WS individuals demonstrate good syntactic 
abilities these abilities do not exceed the 7-year-old level of normal language development. 
Finally, my investigation was based on studies conducted on English-speaking individuals 
with WS. In order to better understand the nature of WS language cross-linguistic studies 
should be included also.    
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